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SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION
District Court Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Third Judicial District Court had original jurisdiction as the trial court in this
criminal matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78-3-4(1)

Court of Appeals Jurisdiction
The Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-22(3)(I). The matter was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals on March 13,1997.
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a3(2)(j).

Order on Appeal
The defendant appealsfromthe trial court's Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw
and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for New Trial (filed March 15, 2002); Aplt. A-74.
The defendant further appealsfromhis convictions on two counts of Aggravated
Robbery, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-302, as amended, in
thefinalwritten Order ofFinalJudgment, Sentence and Commitment (filed November
13,2002);^//.A-86.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

Issue of Argument I:
Whether the trial court improperly prevented the defense from cross examining the
victim's regarding their immigration status, in violation of the right of confrontation,
which if allowed would have established that they were both illegal aliens, and that at
least one had previously been deported, establishing that they were not credible about the
existence of the contents of their wallets and as to whether their wallets were taken.
Objection Preserving Issue: On April 16,2001, the State of Utah filed a motion in
limine, together with a memorandum, to preclude the defense from inquiring into the
victims immigration status, acknowledging that they were both illegal aliens. Motion in
Limine Re: Victims' Immigration and Custody Status (filed April 16, 2001) Aplt. A-26;
Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Victims' Immigration and Custody
Status (filed April 16, 2001) Aplt. A-28. Oral arguments on the states motion in limine
were held on April 24,2001. At trial defense counsel attempted to cross examine the first
of the two victims regarding their immigration status, and was precluded from doing so
upon the state's objections. Tr. p. 147. Defense counsel was then under the onus of
contempt and did not engage in similar cross examination of the second victim.
Standard of Review: The right of confrontation is a question of law based on a
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constitutional right that is reviewed for correctness, while the question of law requires the
application of the facts to construe the standard, requiring the incorporation of the clearly
erroneous standard for the subsidiary factual determinations. See, State v. Hubbard, 48
P.3d 953, 962 (Utah 2002).

Issue of Argument II:
Whether it was plain error for the government to have a law enforcement officer
testify that a co-defendant's stated that Mr. Langi had the wallet in violation of the right
of confrontation
Objection Preserving Issue: No objection was made at trial and therefore is brought on
appeal under the plain error standard. See, Tr. p. 133.
Standard of Review: The court will review error for which no objection is made under
the plain error standard of (1) whether error existed, (2) whether the error should have
been obvious to the court and (3) whether the error was prejudicial. State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). Therightof confrontation is a question of law based on a
constitutional right and is reviewed for correctness, while the question of law requires the
application of the facts to construe the standard, requiring the incorporation of the clearly
erroneous standard for the subsidiary factual determinations. See, State v. Hubbard, 48
P.3d 953,962 (Utah 2002).
3

Issue of Argument III:
Whether it was plain error for the trial court to allow a law enforcement officer to
testify as to his lay interpretation of the events depicted on a video showing the events in
violation of the right of confrontation.
Objection Preserving Issue: No objection was made at trial and therefore is brought
on appeal under the plain error standard. See, Tr. p. 117.
Standard of Review: The court will review error for which no objection is made under
the plain error standard of (1) whether error existed, (2) whether the error should have
been obvious to the court and (3) whether the error was prejudicial. State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). The right of confrontation is a question of law based on a
constitutional right and is reviewed for correctness, while the question of law requires the
application of the facts to construe the standard, requiring the incorporation of the clearly
erroneous standard for the subsidiary factual determinations. See, State v. Hubbard, 48
P.3d 953, 962 (Utah 2002).

Issue of Argument IV:
Whether the trial court erred in allowing the government to introduce evidence
through the prosecution's impeachment of its own witness.
Objection Preserving Issue: This issue was preserved on appeal by the defense's
4

objection. Tr. p. 204-205.
Standard of Review: The introduction of statements in connection with criminal
conduct are reviewed as a matter of law for correctness. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,
239 (Utah 1992).

Issue of Argument V:
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial based
on the newly discovered evidence that established that the co-defendant's material
statement to law enforcement prior to trial was false.
Objection Preserving Issue: The issue was preserved by the defendant by motion;
Motion for a New Trial (filed May 31, 2001) & Memorandum in Support ofDefendant's
Motion for a New Trial (filed June 25,2001) Aplt. A-33 & A-36.
Standard of Review: The standard of review when the court reviews the denial of a
motion for a new trial is the clear abuse of discretion by the trial court standard. State v.
Colwelli, 2000 UT 8, \ 12, 994 P.2d 177; State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES
RULES AND REGULATIONS REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
IN THIS APPEAL

Federal Constitutional Provisions
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment
State Constitutional Provisions
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7
Federal Statutes
8U.S.C. §1182
8U.S.C. §1325
8U.S.C. §1326
State Statutes
U.C. § 53-3-205
U.C. § 76-6-302
Rules
U.R.E. 701
U.R.E. 704
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant was convicted of two counts of Aggravated Robbery, both first degree
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, as amended, with gun and gang
enhancements.

Course of Proceedings
On October 13,2000, Mr. Langi was charged in an information with two counts of
Aggravated Robbery, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6302, as amended, with gun and gang enhancements, was filed in the Third Judicial
District Court, State of Utah, Dock. No. 001917415. A preliminary hearing was held on
December 5,2000, before the Hon. Paul G. Maughn, and Mr. Langi was bound over to
stand trial on both counts. Also on December 5,2000, the case was assigned to the Hon.
Judith S. Atherton, District Judge. Mr. Langi was arraigned on December 18, 2000, and
plead not guilty to both counts.
On April 16,2001, the Final Pretrial Conference was held and the State of Utah filed a
motion in limine, together with a memorandum, to preclude the defense from inquiring
into the victims immigration status, acknowledging that they were both illegal aliens.
Motion in Limine Re: Victims' Immigration and Custody Status (filed April 16,2001)
7

Aplt. A-26; Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Victims' Immigration and
Custody Status (filed April 16, 2001) Aplt A-28. Oral arguments on the states motion in
limine were held on April 24,2001, at which time the court addressed the question of the
defense cross examining the victims5 immigration statice. Trial began the next day, on
April 25,2001 and continued through April 26,2001, at which time the jury returned a
verdict of guilty on both counts against Mr. Langi.
At the end of the first day of trial, April 25,2001, the government moved to hold
defense counsel in contempt of court for the violation of the Order granting motion in
limine, which the trial court took under advisement at that time. At the conclusion of
trial, on April 26,2001, the court held defense counsel in contempt of court for violation
of the Order granting the motion in limine. On May 23,2001, defense counsel paid the
contempt fine.
On June 11, 2001, Mr. Langi was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of nine (9)
years to life for the convictions of aggravated robbery with gun and gang enhancements.
No fine was imposed, but he was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $3,728. 47.
Mr. Langi was immediately remanded to the custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff and
transported to the Utah State Prison.
Mr. Langi filed a Motion for a New Trial on May 31,2001, prior to Sentencing. On
June 25, 2001, after sentencing, Mr. Langifiledhis Memorandum in Support of
8

Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, Aplt. A-36. A hearing was held on the motion for a
new trial on September 7,2001, which was orally denied with the government to submit
findings of fact and conclusions of law. On February 20,2002, the defendant filed
Defendant }s Objections to Proposed Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw and Order
Re: Defendant's Motion for New Trial. On the March 15, 2002, the court denied the
objections and signed the Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw and Order Re:
Defendant's Motion for New Trial {Aplt A-74) as submitted by the government.
The written Order ofFinal Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was entered by the
trial court on November 13, 2002. A timely notice of appeal was filed on November 26,
2003.

Disposition in the District Court
Appellant was convicted of two counts of Aggravated Robbery, both first degree
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, as amended on April 26, 2002, and
sentenced to two indeterminate terms of nine years to life, running concurrently on June
11, 2002. The Defendant's Motion for a New Trial was filed May 31, 2001; and was
denied on March 15,2002 in the trial court's written Findings ofFact and Conclusions of
Law and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for New Trial, Aplt. A-74. The trial court
entered its written Order ofFinalJudgment, Sentence and Commitment, Aplt A-86, on
9

November 13,2002.

Statement of Relevant Facts
During the early morning hours of February 26, 2000, Jose Farias, together with
Rachel Redding and Gabriel Calvillo went to Beto's restaurant in Kearns, Utah, to have
dinner. Tr. p. 135-136; Tr. p. 179. Beto's restaurant is a 24-hour, fast food, Mexican
restaurant. Tr. p. 179. At the time of his arrival at the restaurant Mr. Farias was wearing
an earring in his right eyebrow, he recalls arriving at the restaurant with his wallet. Tr. p.
136-137. The three ordered their food and sat down at a table to eat. Tr.p.180. While
they were eating three Polynesian men, Konai Bloomfield, Siaosi Afa, and Joseph Langi
entered the restaurant. Tr. p. 180, 202, 203. After entering the restaurant they
approached the table where Mr. Farias, Ms. Redding and Mr. Calvillo were sitting, and
Mr. Afii said to Mr. Farias, "Everything is cool. We are just here to get something to
eat." (Tr. p. 181) and Mr. Afii shook Mr. Farias's hand. Tr. p. 158. The three men went
to the counter to order their food. Tr.p.182.
While the three men were at the counter Mr. Farias asked Ms. Redding to go to the
counter and get him a soda. Tr. p. 182. Ms. Redding approached the counter and Mr.
Farias put on his coat and followed behind her. Tr. p. 182, 187. As she approached the
counter the three men, who were standing together, let Ms. Redding and Mr. Farias ahead
10

of them. Tr. p. 182. As Ms. Redding was ordering she saw Mr. Farias fall forward,
hitting his head on the cash register. Tr. p. 183. Mr. Bloomfield punched Mr. Farias, and
in that single blow knocked him out. Tr. p. 117.
While Ms. Redding and Mr. Farias were approaching the counter, Mr. Calvillo got up,
and Mr. Langi stood behind him. Tr.pl 16. When Mr. Bloomfield struck Mr. Farias Mr.
Langi also struck Mr. Calvillo in the head. Tr. p. 117. Then Mr. Langi went over to Mr.
Farias and bent over. Tr. p. 117. Officer Lone testified that while Mr. Langi was bent
over Mr. Farias, Mr. Langi was "going through Farias's pocket." Tr. p. 117. Mr. Langi
stomped on Mr. Farias's head. Tr. p. 117. After stomping on Mr. Farias's head, Mr.
Langi went back over to Mr. Calvillo. Tr. p. 117. At which time, Officer Lone testified,
Mr. Langi went through Mr. Calvillo's pockets. Tr. p. 117.
Officer Lone first testified that Mr. Calvillo's wallet had been taken, and that Mr.
Calvillo had lost his cash from a cashed paycheck and his green card. Tr. p. 119. Officer
Lone testified that a green card is an INS card that establishes a person is legally in the
country and can work. Tr. p. 119. After Officer Lone had testified that it was Mr.
Calvillo who had lost the wallet, he changed his testimony indicating that he had been
mistaken, and that was Mr. Farias who had lost the wallet containing the cashed his
paycheck and INS card. Tr. p. 119. Officer Lone never investigated whether or not Mr.
Farias ever had an INS card. Tr. p. 120. Officer Lone never determined whether an INS
11

card existed. Tr.p.127.
Ms. Redding testified that she did not see anything come out of Mr. Farias's pockets.
Tr.p,193.
Mr. Farias had no memory of what happened once he was struck until the next
morning, as he was unconscious. Tr. p, 137, 139. He testified that when he went to the
restaurant he had a wallet with him. Tr. p. 136. He stated that Ms. Redding had his
money and that he did not know if anybody took any money from him. Tr. p. 143-144.
When he woke up at the hospital he no longer had his eyebrow ring, he did not know
what had become of it and never found it again. Tr. 141. Mr. Farias acknowledged that
he was a convicted felon for a weapons charge. Tr. p. 146. However, when asked
whether he claimed to have had an INS card on the night the incident occurred the court
sustained an objection on grounds of relevance. Tr.p. 147. Mr. Farias never testified that
his wallet, or that his money, had been taken.
After Mr. Farias had testified, but before Mr. Calvillo testified, the Court took a
recess, at which time the prosecution objected to defense counsel's questions regarding
the witnesses immigration status pursuant to the motion in limine. Tr. p. 149. The
prosecution did, however, ask that defense counsel be held in contempt, and the court
indicated it would reserve on that issue until the end of trial. Tr. p 149-150. At the end of
the trial the court did, in fact, hold defense counsel in contempt of court andfinedhim.
12

Tr.p.278.
Mr. Calvillo testified that when he went to the restaurant he had a wallet with about
$80 in it, and when he woke up at the hospital he no longer had his wallet, and never got
it or the money back. Tr. p. 164. He testified he kept his wallet in his back pant pocket.
Tr. p.-172. He further testified that his clothes were thrown away (implying by the
hospital). Tr. p. 172. Mr. Calvillo testified that in his wallet there had been a driver's
license and "some information papers." Tr. p. 174. Defense counsel, under the pending
contempt charge, did not ask Mr. Calvillo anything about the EMS card, or Mr. Calvillo's
immigration status.
It should also be noted that Mr. Calvillo did not testify with regarding to Mr. Farias's
eyebrow ring.
It should also be noted that when Officer Lone spoke with Mr. Calvillo, officer Loan
had Mr. Farias act as translator between Officer Lone and Mr. Calvillo. Tr. p. 127,1. 1921.
This appeal contests the admission of evidence at trial with regard to whether Mr.
Langi took anythingfromthe victim at the time of the assault and the trial court's failure
to consider newly discovered evidence after the trial. At trial, counsel for the defendant
acknowledged Mr. Langi was guilty of the assault, saying, "Mr. Langi admits that he did
wrong, He did not commit an aggravated robbery. He will plead to you that he is guilty
13

of an assault." Tr. /?. 65,1 15-17. Mr. Langi's assault charges were aggravated because
the government alleged he "took" something during the course of the assault.
Information, "unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the possession of...
or immediate presence." of the victim.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Argument I
The trial erred in preventing the defense from cross examining the two victims about
the fact that they were illegal aliens, and in holding the defense counsel in contempt for
attempting to do so. The fact that the victims were illegal aliens meant that they could not
work, drive, or hold INS cards, which they claimed were in the wallets that were taken.
The defense should have been permitted to cross examine the victims regarding their
immigration status as it would have established that they either lied under oath in
obtaining a paycheck, driver's license or INS card or that they had lied about even having
the cash from a paycheck, a driver's license or an INS card. Thus establishing their
propensity to make false statements under oath and negating the existence of wallets and
the claimed content.

Argument II
The government had a law enforcement officer testify that during the interrogation of
a co-defendant that the co-defendant stated that Mr. Langi had the wallet. This testimony
directly violated Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,135, 88 S.Ct. 1620,20 L.Ed.2d
476 (1968).
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Argument III
The trial court permitted plain error when it allowed a law enforcement officer to
testify as to his lay interpretation of the events depicted on a video showing the events in
violation of the right of confrontation. The testifying officer had watched the video about
20 times and during the time the jury was watching the video made statements
interpreting the events depicted. Placing a spin, or interpretation, on the events being
shown to the jury, when the officer had no personal knowledge of the events is an
improper use of lay witness opinion evidence.

Argument IV
The trial court erred when it allowed the government to introduce evidence through
the prosecution's impeachment of its own witness. Mr. Afii was called by the
government for the purpose of introducing evidence that Mr. Langi had a victim's wallet
after the incident. Instead, Mr. Afu testified that he had no recollection of seeing Mr.
Langi with a wallet after the incident. The prosecution then impeached Mr. Afii with a
transcript from a prior interrogation by law enforcement; but the court did not instruct the
jury that the impeachment could not be considered as evidence.

16

Argument V
The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial based on the
newly discovered evidence that, as conceded by the prosecution, Mr. Afii lied during the
interrogation by law enforcement when he said that he saw Mr. Langi with a victim's
wallet after the incident, and that Mr. Afu could not read. The lie about the wallet during
the interrogation was introduced both through the Bruton violation that is the subject of
Argument II, and to impeach Mr. Afu which is the subject of Argument IV.
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ARGUMENTI
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT
DISCRETION WHEN IT PREVENTED DEFENSE
COUNSEL FROM CROSS-EXAMINING THE VICTIM
REGARDING PROPERTY ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN
STOLEN.
On April 16, 2003, the government filed a Motion in Limine Re: Victims' Immigration
and Custody Status, together with a Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Limine Re:
Victims' Immigration and Custody Status. In the government's memorandum they state
that both Mr. Farias and Mr. Calvillo were residing illegally in the United States.
Memorandum, p. 2, ^[3.
At the pretrial conference the issue of Mr. Farias's and Mr. Calvillo's immigration
status was briefly mentioned. Defense counsel indicated that the immigration and
custody status would arise if the government mentioned the matter or if it became
relevant as a defense, which counsel indicated "is highly probable that it will be."
Hearing Tr (Apr. 24, 1991) p. 9. The trial court indicated that it could not see how
immigration status would be relevant. Id.
Whether Mr. Farias and/or Mr. Calvillo told officer Loan that a wallet having an INS
card was taken was material to the defense in the present case. An illegal alien being
questioned by law enforcement would be inherently concerned that their illegal status
would be discovered and that they would be prosecuted. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1325 it is
18

a federal offense to be present in the United States illegally, and pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1326 it is substantial offense if an illegal alien returns after being deported, and if the
person was convicted of a violent felony prior to their deportation it constitutes an offense
for which a person may be imprisoned for 20 years. The fact that an illegal alien faces
substantial federal criminal charges, especially for aggravated reentry, creates a powerful
incentive for the illegal alien to tell a law enforcement officer that their wallet was stolen
or is missing, and that as a consequence they don't have their INS card along with other
items commonly found in a wallet
The fact that the victims who claimed to have the wallet that was taken also claim that
it contained an INS card was both relevant and material to the defense. The defense
clearly sought to establish that these victims lied about the wallet being stolen with an
INS card in it to hide the fact that they were illegal aliens. The government has
acknowledged that they were illegal aliens so they could not have had an INS card, so
clearly they lied to Officer Lone. The lie about the INS card and their immigration status
was also materially relevant to whether they cashed a paycheck, as legal presence in the
United States would be required in order for a person to legally work. No INS card
means it was illegal for them to work, no work means no paycheck, ergo no cash in the
wallet, ergo no wallet.
In the present case the court prevented the defense from establishing the nature and
19

degree of the motivation Mr. Farias and Mr. Calvillo had to lie to Officer Lone, and that
the illegal immigrant status militated against them having cashed a paycheck or a legal
driver's license. In other words, the immigration status went to the validity of the entire
content of the purported wallet, and thus the existence of the wallet itself. Before defense
counsel was placed under the onus of contempt, he had established grounds to believe Mr.
Farias was guilty of aggravated reentry for which he could go to federal prison for up to
20 years for having a prior history for a violent felony, and having been previously
deported. See, 8 U.S.C. §1326. Counsel was prevented from fully establishing the
impeachment due to the government's objection. Counsel was then under the onus of
contempt when he questioned Mr. Calvillo, and consequently could not pursue it to
establish: (1) there was no INS card, (2) there was no paycheck as such would be in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), or that such work was illegal for which no check issued,
(3) there was no driver's license, or that such a license was obtained by false oath,
because U.C. §53-3-205(9)(a)(I)(A)-(F) requires a person to provide their name, place of
birth, social security or temporary identification number, and residence address.
It was highly material and relevant in the present case that the victims were illegal
aliens. The court erred and abused its discretion when it precluded the defense from
asking questions regarding their immigration status, and the charge and pending contempt
chilled defense counsels ability and opportunity to conduct an appropriate cross20

examination which would have established the enormous lack of credibility of Mr. Farias
and Mr. Calvillo. The fact that the defense was precluded from cross-examining in this
area prejudiced the defendant, as the lack of a paycheck, cash, an INS card, and drivers
license would have established that the wallet was fictitious; grounds for the jury to have
acquitted the defendant of both counts of aggravated robbery.

ARGUMENT II
WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO
HAVE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TESTIFY THAT A CODEFENDANT'S STATED THAT MR. LANGI HAD THE WALLET
It was plain error for the government to have Officer Lone to testify to the jury that
during his interview of the co-defendant Mr. Afu, that Mr. Afu had stated that the
defendant Mr. Langi had thrown the victim's walletfromthe car. To establish plain
error, appellant must show: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208 (Utah 1993). The error in this case is a violation of Bruton and the confrontation
clause. It should have been obvious to the trial court because of how the question was put
to the witness by the prosecutor. It was harmful in that the prosecutor concedes Mr. Afu
lied, and there is no other evidence of Mr. Langi having possession of the wallet, not even
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from the declarant Mr. Afu.
The error in the present case arises from an out-of-court statement by a co-defendant
about a defendant offered for the truth of the matter asserted, introduced by the
prosecution at trial through the testimony of an investigating officer. The trial court
should have immediately recognized the Bruton and confrontation violations of the
testimony when the prosecutor asks the question: Tell me officer what did the codefendant say the defendant did?
Q. My question is this, Detective, When is the first time that you were told that the
wallet had been thrown out near the Methodist church near Kearns.
A. During Mr. Afii's interview.
Q. That was March 23; is that correct?
A. March 22.
Q. Did he indicate to you who had thrown the wallet out of the car?
A. He said that Mr. Langi had.
Tr.p. 133,1.9-17.
The values protected by due process and the constitutional right of confrontation,
which are preserved by both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution. U.S. Const.
Amends. VI & XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 & 12 have been expressed as follows:
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Classically, the primary object of the constitutional right of confrontation is to
prevent depositions and ex parte affidavits from being used against the accused at
trial in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness against
him. When confrontation is available the accused has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling
him to stand face-to-face with the jury in order that they may look at him and judge
by his demeanor and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief. Encompassed in this right of confrontation is the procedural
right of cross-examination and the recognition of certain procedural rights
regarding the exclusion of extra judicial statements, similar to those found
protected by evidentiary rules excluding hearsay evidence.
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 785, 778 (Utah 1980)(footnotes omitted); accord Murray
City v.Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Utah 1983); Mattoxv. United States, 156U.S.237,
242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339-40, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895).
The general rule is that when an out-of-court statement is offered at trial for the truth
of the matter asserted and the declarant is present and available for cross-examination, no
federal or state confrontation problem is presented. State v. Loughton, 1M P.2d 426,429
(Utah 1987). It has been recognized, on the other hand, that if the declarant is not
present, the core values of the confrontation right are implicated because ff[t]he essence of
the confrontation right is the opportunity to have the accusing witness in court and subject
to cross-examination, so that bias and credibility can be evaluated by thefinderof fact."
State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353,1356 (Utah 1986). In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123,135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the United States Supreme Court holding
that, regardless of a limiting jury instruction, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
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confrontation is violated "when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying
codefendant is introduced at their joint trial.11 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207,
107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). The Court determined that where a confession
"expressly implicates" the defendant, the jury cannot be assumed to consider such
"powerfully incriminating" evidence only with regard to the guilt of the declarant. Id. at
208,107 S.Ct. 1702 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124 n. 1,135, 88 S.Ct. 1620).
The Bruton and Richardson and confrontation violations are obvious in the present
case, as they should have been to the trial court. Officer Lone who was testifying about
what the codefendant Mr. Afii said the defendant Mr. Langi had done. The prosecutor's
question would clearly alert any trial court to the error when she asked Officer Loan: "Did
he [referring to Mr. Afii] indicate to you who had thrown the wallet out of the car?" Tr.
p. 133, l. 15 -17. The classical Bruton and confrontation violation arises when a
prosecutor asks an officer to tell a jury what a codefendant said the defendant did, it is
always an error that is immediately apprehendable.
The testimony by Officer Lone that Mr. Afu stated Mr. Langi threw away the wallet
violated the rules established by the Bruton and Richardson holdings. Mr. Afii was a codefendant making a statement which expressly implicated Mr. Langi. The rule in Bruton
applies directly to statements by co-defendants. Although the present case is not a joint
trial, as in Bruton, the present case was likewise not complicated by the need for the
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approved method which requires redaction. See State v. Nield, 804 P.2d 537, 539-40
(Utah Ct.App.1990). A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is violated
when a codefendant's statement directly implicating the defendant is introduced at trial
through an interrogating officer. Clearly there was error in the present case, and it
constituted an error that should have been obvious to the trial court.
This error was harmful and in its absence, it is highly likely that the outcome of the
trial would have been different. At trial the prosecution called the co-defendant, Mr. Afii,
after Officer Lone testified. Mr. Afii testified that he stated that he did not recall seeing
Mr. Langi with a wallet. Tr. p. 204,1 5-9. Consequently, the prosecutor impeached him,
during which time Mr. Afii admitted that his testimony was inconsistent with the
statement he had made to the investigators. Tr. p. 205,1. 21 top. 206,1. 1. Even so, Mr.
Afii never testified that Mr. Langi ever had the wallet.

ARGUMENT III
WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
PERMIT A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TO INVADE THE
PROVINCE OF THE JURY TESTIFY AS TO HIS INTERPRETATION
OF THE EVENTS DEPICTED ON A VIDEO SHOWING THE EVENTS.
During the time the jury was viewing the video Officer Lone did more than identify
the various individuals, he gave a commentary regarding what the jury was viewing.
Officer Lone invaded the province of the jury when he gave his opinion during the jury's
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viewing of the video that Mr. Langi was going through Mr. Faria's pockets.
Officer Lone was not present at Beto's restaurant in Kearns, Utah, on February 26,
2000, when the events occurred which have precipitated this case. He was assigned to
conduct the investigation in the case. Tr. p. 104,I. 4-8. However, he did not know any of
the individuals involved. Tr. p. 107,1 1-4. During his investigation he obtained a video
of the events from Beto's restaurant. Tr. p. 104,1. 18-20. He watched the video
approximately 20 times. Tr. p. 16-17, p. 118,1. 23-24. The video tape did not include
any audio. Tr. p. 110,1. 20-22.
During the time the video was playing Officer Lone identified the various individuals
including Gabriel Calvillo, Tr. p. Ill, I. 7; Rachel Redding, Tr. p. Ill, I. 12; Jose Farias,
Tr. p. 112, I. 3; Siaosi Afu, Jr (aka "George") Tr. p. 114,1. 11, 19; Konai Bloomfield, Tr.
p. 115,1. 1; and Joseph Langi, Tr. p. 115,1. 3.
As the events transpired during the critical period of the viewing of video tape at trial
Officer Lone testified to his interpretation of the events, stating:
THE WITNESS: She walks over here and stands here for a second. Mr.
Bloomfield gets his change. And you will see the defendant at today's trial, Mr.
Langi, walk over here and he will stand behind Gabriel Calvillo. The assault starts
simultaneously. See Mr. Bloomfield punch Farias in the head and knock him out,
and simultaneously this is Mr. Langi punching Calvillo in the head, full blast,
alternate fists, blow after blow. Afu, he engages in the attach initially, then he
leaves, walks outside to get the car. Langi comes over, bends over and starts going
through Farias's pocket.
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MR. GOTAY: Objection -THE COURT: Lets not argue. I will rule on it. The objection is overruled.
THE WITNESS: Then he starts stomping on his head, nearly slips and falls. Walks
back over and goes through Calvillo's pockets.
Tr.p. 116,1. 22 top. 117,1. 13.
The facts shown in the video speak for themselves, and it was inappropriate for
Officer Lone to add his interpretation and comment to what was being seen by the jury.
The commentary regarding the assault are not germane to this appeal. However, Offer
Lone's commentary with respect to what, if anything, Mr. Langi was doing with respect
to Mr. Farias and Mr. Calvillo is highly relevant and unduly prejudicial to Mr. Langi.
Officer Lone's testimony is merely his interpretation and opinion that Mr. Langi was
going through the pockets.
Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows a lay witness to give an opinion.
Under Rule 701, a lay person can give opinion testimony if the opinion is "(a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness1 testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Utah R.Evid. 701.
In the present case Officer Lone's ability to perceive the evidence was not better than
that of any other member of the jury. The jury was in a position to view the video, and if
it so desired to review it if necessary. Moreover, Officer Lone's perception of the video
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was identical to that the jury had, he viewed exactly the same video as was in evidence.
Officer Lone's testimony was not helpful to a clear understanding of a factual issue,
rather it was an interpretation given to the facts in the light favorable to the government.
Officer Lone was not at the scene when the crime occurred. He did not use any special
tools or techniques in viewing the video. He was not testifying to anything more than the
jury would experience first hand by watching the video. Instead, he was giving an
official governmental commentary as to the interpretation to be given to the conduct
shown on the video.
The Rules of Evidence state that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704; accord State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,
1362 (Utah 1993). However, Rule 704 does not allow all opinions. See Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah Ct.App.1991). InDavidson, this court stated,ff '[t]he
Advisory Committee notes [to Rule 704] make it clear that questions which would merely
allow the witness to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor is the rule
intended to allow a witness to give legal conclusions.1" Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)). In the present
case, Officer Lone's commentary was simply telling the jury that when they observed Mr.
Langi with each victim they were to conclude that his conduct was that of going through
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their pockets, the clear implication being that he was looking for something to take.
"The determination of whether [a witness's] opinion embraces an ultimate factual issue
or constitutes a legal conclusion is a difficult call because f[t]here is no bright line
between permissible questions under Rule 704 and those that call for overbroad legal
responses.1 " Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493 (quoting Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1231). However,
the determination in the present case is simplified in that Officer Lone's testimony was
merely a commentary on how the jury should interpret the same video he had watched.
He was not a witness with first hand knowledge of the events, he was not a witness
providing expert technical information, he was merely the government's spokesman
providing the official government spin on the events being observed.
It is well settled that, "like any other evidentiary ruling, an erroneous decision to admit
or exclude evidence ... cannot result in reversible error unless the error is harmful."
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. An error is harmful only if "absent the error there is a
reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant." Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1221. Reversal is required when an error undermines confidence in the verdict. See
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. To that end, the analysis includes, among other things, the
importance of the challenged testimony and the overall strength of the State's case in
evaluating whether an error is harmful. See id. In the present case Officer Lone's
statements were highly improperly prejudicial. There is more than a reasonable
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likelihood, there is a significant likelihood that the verdict as to both aggravated robbery
convictions would have been different in the absence of Officer Lone's play-by-play
interpreting the conduct shown on the video. Consequently, due to the improper lay
opinion offered by Officer Lone, the convictions in the present case should be reversed
and remanded for new trial.

ARGUMENT IV
WHETHER IT WAS ERROR WHEN THE PROSECUTION WAS
PERMITTED TO IMPEACH ITS OWN WITNESS AND THE JURY
WAS NOT INSTRUCTED THAT IMPEACHMENT IS NOT EVIDENCE.
Mr. Afu was called at trial and proceeded to testify that he did not remember Mr.
Langi having anything with him after the incident, when Mr. Langi got in the car.
Q. Do you recall whether the defendant had anything with him when he got into your
car?
A. You know what, I really don't remember.
Q. You don't remember if he had anything in his hand?
A. No. I don't remember - no, I don't.
Tr. p. 204,1.5-9.
The prosecution then proceeded to impeach Mr. Afu, and impeachment based
exclusively on what Mr. Afu had previously stated to the investigators and which it has
conceded was a lie at the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial.

MR. GOTAY: Objection, your Honor, she is impeaching her own witness.
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MS. WHISSLER: Your Honor, the rules of evidence specifically allow me to impeach
my own witness.
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
Q. Do you recall telling the detective when the defendant got into your car he had the
wallet with him.
A. No, I don't recall, but if that's what I told him then ...
MS. WHISSLER: May I approach the witness, you Honor.
THE COURT: Yes.
Q. Are you aware of the interview you had with Detective Lone was audio recorded?
A. Yes.
Q. What was it that you told Detective Lone when you were interviewed?
A. Do you want me to read this?
Q. I just want - 1 want to ask you if that refreshes your memory about what you told
Detective Lone.
A. Yes, this is what I told him, I guess. It was too long ago. I don't really remember
what I said. But, yeah, this is what I said. If it was on tape, this is everything I said.
Q. That transcript accurately reflects the interview you had with Detective Lone.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you not tell Detective Lone it was the defendant that had a wallet in his hand
when he got into your car?
A. Yes.
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Q. Did you also tell Detective Lone that the defendant threw the wallet out of the car
at some point?
A. Yes, I did.
Tr.p. 204,1.15 to p. 206, LI.
It has long been a matter of well settled law in Utah that impeachment is not evidence.
In State v. Burns, 51 Utah 73,168 P. 955 (Utah 1917) the court held that statements made
by witnesses out of court, contrary to their testimony, can be considered only as to their
credibility, and not as evidence of the facts. Burns involved a defendant that was
convicted of having carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of 15 years. Id. In Burns
the Court, reviewed the jury instruction regarding evidence, which stated:
Evidence has been introduced of statements made by witnesses out of court,
contrary to the testimony given by them upon the witness stand. And you are
instructed that such evidence cannot be considered by you as any proof of the facts
contained in such statements, but can only be considered as affecting the
credibility of such witnesses, and the weight that should be given to their
testimony.'' (emphasis original)
Id. at 956. In upholding this instruction, focusing on the emphasized language, the court
noted:
Impeaching evidence of the character referred to in the instruction is admissible for
the sole purpose of informing the jury that the witness in question has made
contradictory or conflicting statements regarding a particular fact in issue. The
jury may thus take those statements into consideration in determining the
credibility of the witness and the weight that should be given to his testimony. In
any other respect the evidence is merely hearsay, and hence not competent to
establish the facts contained in the conflicting statements which it is alleged were
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made by the witness.
Id. See also, State v. Herrera, 338 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1958).
Prior to State v. Chynoweth, 41 Utah 354, 126 P. 302 (Utah 1912) the Utah Supreme
Court stated the controlling rule of law:
A witness may be impeached by proof of verbal statements made by him out of
court upon a material point, which are contradictory of his testimony on the trial,
though such statements are not admissible as independent evidence upon the
merits.
Id. at 305. Chynoweth was a case involving the theft of a heifer calf. The court,
addressing the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, noted, "[t]he rule is elementary that
'what a witness, who is not a party, states out of court is not evidence in chief to prove the
fact as stated by him, but can only be shown to discredit his testimony at the trial, when
his testimony is contradicted by such outside statements. The effect of proving
contradictory statements extends no further than the question of credibility; it does not
tend to establish the truth of the matter embraced in the contradictory statements; it
simply goes to the credibility of the witness.9" Id. (emphases original). The rule has been
so axiomatic that Utah has only these few seminal cases addressing this rule of law.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has more recently followed this axiom of law. In
United States v. Lemon, 497 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974) the Tenth Circuit noted that prior
inconsistent statements are admissible to impeach or discredit one's witness. Id. at 857
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(citing, United States v. Eaton, 485 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1973); Brooks v. United States,
309 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962)). The Lemon court went on to note that:
"[s]uch statements are admissible solely for purposes of impeachment, and then
only insofar as they serve to remove the damage of surprise. Such statements
cannot be used, by indirection, to present testimony to the jury which the
Government expected the witness to supply directly. United States v. Hill, 481
F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1973)
a prior inconsistent statement may be used solely
insofar as it relates to credibility, and in no event is it to be considered for the truth
of its contents. United States v. Gilliam, 484 F.2d 1093 (D.C.Cir. 1973)."
Id
In the present case Mr. Afu testified that he had no recollection of Mr. Langi having
the wallet. It was highly prejudicial for the court to permit the prosecution to use the
impeachment as evidence that Mr. Langi had the wallet.
A perhaps more significant prejudice to Mr. Langi is that Mr. Afu's testimony
compounds the Bruton err, and the violation of Mr. Langi's Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation. The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment which made applicable
to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, is not violated by admitting a declarant's
out-of-court statements, so long as the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to
cross-examination. The purpose of the amendment is satisfied because the declarants
appeared as witnesses in court, under oath, subject to cross-examinettion, and their
demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact. California v. Green 399 U.S. 149,90 S.Ct.
1930,26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). In the present case, however, the declarant appeared and
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testified that he did not recall the facts to which Officer Lone testified. Consequently, the
declarant testified contrary to the assertion made by Officer Lone. The prosecution then
impeached Mr. Afu. This compounds the egregiousness of the Bruton violation because
the impeachment makes Officer Lone's statement about what Mr. Afu said Mr. Langi did
appear as more acceptable and credible as evidence. In reality it is nothing more than
inadmissible hearsay being offered by the prosecution in a Bruton violation, and then
being bolstered by impeachment. This violation of the confrontation clause is highly
prejudicial, rendered even more significant because Mr. Afii's impeachment was used to
corroborate Officer Lone's improper statement. Both Officer Lone's statement as to what
Mr. Afu said about what Mr. Langi did, and the impeachment of Mr. Afu were
improperly introduced by the government and used improperly as evidence in the present
case and as such require a reversal of the aggravated robbery convictions in the present
case.
ARGUMENT V
WHETHER IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT ESTABLISHED THAT THE
CO-DEFENDANT'S MATERIAL STATEMENT TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT PRIOR TO TRIAL WAS FALSE
After the trial Mr. Afu swore out a statement for the defense in which he stated, in
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relevant part, ffI DID NOT SEE JOE TOOK OR STEAL ANYTHING FROM THE 2
VICTIMS, BECAUSE I HAVE LEFT THE SEEN TO PICK UP THE VEHICLE."
Memorandum in Support ofDefendant fs Motion for a New Trial Exhibit 1. The
government interviewed Mr. Afu in its preparation of its memorandum in response to the
defendant's Motion for a New Trial. Mr. Afu told the governments investigator that he
had lied during the first investigative interview about Mr. Langi taking the wallet.

KJ: Okay, You mentioned that you did lie to the investigator but I couldn't see where
you did okay so if you can try to explain to me where you think you lied to the
investigator?
SA: Well I got, see the thing was, when we first got caught...
KJ:Uh-huh.
SA: I never thought Joe would get caught so when we interviewed with the
investigator, I told the investigator I put everything on Joe.
KJ:Uh-huh.
SA: So when there was, you know when he asked about wallets I was like, "Yeah he
took them and...
KJ:Uh-huh.
SA: And he asked me where I, where he threw them and I told him see the whole
statement about Joe was all incorrect cause I knew Joe
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial, Exhibit titled "Siaosi
Afu Purjury Transcripts"p. 8, See. Aplt. A-45, 54. The State's own evidence shows that
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Mr. Afu lied about Mr. Langi ever having the wallet.
Additionally, Mr. Afu stated can only read a little English. Id., p. 1 & 4; Aplt. A-45
&49.
At the hearing on the Motion for New Trial the prosecution conceded that Mr. Afu had
lied to the investigators. "Well, the State concedes that he lied to investigators, he told
the jury that he lied to investigators. He told the jury he had lied about certain things that
he was interviewed about by Detective Jeff Lund [sic, Lone]. Those are things that were
known to the defendant at the time of trial..." Motion Hearing, Sept. 7,2001, p. 9,1.15
- 21. There is only one matter which could even be considered the "certain things"
referred to by the prosecutor, that is that Mr. Afu lied to the investigators when he said
that Mr. Langi had the wallet. The state expressly conceded at the motion hearing that
Mr. Afu lied when he stated to investigators that Mr. Langi had the wallet.
Mr. Afu's lie that Mr. Langi had the wallet is the very fact which the state relied upon
at trial to establish that something had been "taken" at trial.1 The government first

1

Mr. Afu's lie consistently appears in the evidence acquired by both the government
and the defendant with respect to the Motion for New Trial and Request for Evidentiary Hearing
Aplt. A-33. See, Memorandum in Support ofDefendant's Motion for a New Trial, Exhibit 1,
Aplt. A-36 & Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial, Exhibit uSiaos
Afu Purjury Transcripts, p. 9, Aplt. A-54.
37

introduced Mr. Afu's lie through the testimony of Officer Lone. Tr. p. 133,1 15-17?

In

State v. Calliham, 55 P.3d 573 (Utah 2002) the court stated "a criminal conviction
procured by the knowing use of false testimony" must be vacated "if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." State v.
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24 (Utah 1984). In Cunningham the defendant failed to identify any
false testimony offered at trial. In the present case it is clear that Afu's statement to
officers was false, and that the false statement was offered at trial through the testimony
of Officer Lone. One of the seminal dangers raised by a violation of the confrontation
clause is that false statements made out-of-court, such as Mr. Afu lie, improperly become
the evidence of the case through the Bruton violation and the improper use of
impeachment as evidence, previously addressed in this brief.
It is significant that the government has acknowledged that Mr. Afii's statement that
Mr. Langi had the wallet was a lie for another reason in connection with the trial court's
err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. It is this lie which was relied upon
and improperly introduced by the government in violation of Bruton, and which was the
basis of the impeachment of Mr. Afu at trial when Mr. Afu said he did not recall Mr.

2

It should be noted that the focus of the argument here is that it is now known a lie was
introduced and relied upon by the government at trial, and not that at the time of trial the
prosecutor knew Mr. Afu statement was a lie. There is no evidence in the record to support or
even merit consideration of the later circumstance.
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Langi with the wallet.
It was error, and a blatant error in violation of the confrontation clause for Officer
Lone to testify with regard to what Mr. Afu said he saw Mr. Langi do. The fact that the
statement by Mr. Afu to Officer Lone was false and was brought in by both Officer
Lone's testimony and through Mr. Afu's impeachment compounds the significance of the
newly discovered evidence as asserted by the defendant in his Motion for New Trial
Aplt A-33. The extraordinary degree of prejudice to Mr. Langi is that after the trial the
prosecutor who was the proponent of the statement conceded that the out-of-court
statement was false. Motion Hearing, Sept. 7, 2001, p. 9,1. 12-19. There could be no
o
greater injustice, no greater miscarriage of justice, than that of permitting a conviction to
stand based on a prosecution premised upon the introduction of a statement through a
Bruton violation and impermissible impeachment hearsay, in violation of the
confrontation clause and for which the government acknowledges is a lie. The
convictions of Mr. Langi on both counts of aggravated robbery should therefore be
reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence of Mr.
Afu's lie during police interrogation being used as evidence at trial.
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CONCLUSION
Error is first assigned to the trial in preventing the defense from cross examining the
two victims about the fact that they were illegal aliens, and in holding the defense counsel
in contempt for attempting to do so. The defense should have been permitted to cross
examine the victims regarding their immigration status as it would have established that
they either lied under oath in obtaining a paycheck, driver's license or INS card or that
they had lied about even having the cashfroma paycheck, a driver's license or an INS
card.
Second, plain error is assigned to the government having a law enforcement officer
testify that during the interrogation of a co-defendant that the co-defendant stated that Mr.
Langi had the wallet in violation of the right of confrontation and the rule in Bruton, 391
U.S. at 135.
Third, plain error is assigned to the trial court allowing a law enforcement officer to
testify as to his lay interpretation of the events depicted on a video showing the events in
violation of the right of confrontation. The officer had no personal knowledge of the
events is an improper use of law witness opinion evidence, thus invading the province of
the jury as the finder of fact.
Fourth, err is assigned to the government introducing evidence through the
impeachment of its own witness. The witness's failure to provide the government with
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testimony that Mr. Langi had a wallet after the incident lead to the government's
impeachment of Mr. Afu based on a pretrial interrogation transcript. In error, the
impeachment occurred without the trial court instructing the jury that the impeachment
could not be considered as evidence.
The fifth and final error is assigned to the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion
for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence that Mr. Afu lied during the
interrogation by law enforcement and could not read. The government conceded that Mr.
Afu lied during the interrogation by law enforcement and the undue prejudice arises
because it was the statements of Mr. Afu during the interrogation that were introduced
both through the officer's Bruton violation, and the transcript which was used for the
impeachment that was introduced as evidence.
Each of these errors constitute grounds for the reversal and remand of Mr. Langi's
convictions in the present case, and warrant the award of a new trial.

State Relief Sought
It is respectfully requested that Mr. Langi's convictions on two counts of Aggravated
Robbery, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, as
amended, with gun and gang enhancements, be reversed and vacated, that the matter be
remanded to the district court for a new trial.
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UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 8. ALIENS AND NATIONALITY
CHAPTER 12-IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
SUBCHAPTER II-IMMIGRATION
PART II-ADMISSION QUALIFICATIONS FOR ALIENS: TRAVEL CONTROL OF CITIZENS
AND ALIENS
Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Current through P.L. 108-58, (excluding P.L. 108-36)
approved 07-14-03
8 U.S.C. S 1182. Inadmissible aliens
(a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible
to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

(5) Labor certification and qualifications for certain immigrants
(A) Labor certification
(i) In general
Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is
inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General that(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an
alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United
States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and
(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in
the United States similarly employed.

A-3
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UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 8. ALIENS AND NATIONALITY
CHAPTER 12-IM MIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
SUBCHAPTER II-IMMIGRATION
PART VIII-GENERAL PENALTY PROVISIONS
Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works,
Current through P.L. 108-58, (excluding P.L. 108-36)
approved 07-14-03

§ 1325. Improper entry by alien
(a) Improper time or place; avoidance of examination or inspection; misrepresentation and concealment of facts
Any alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by
immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration officers, or (3) attempts to enter or obtains
entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact,
shall, for the first commission of any such offense, befinedunder Title 18 or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or
both, and, for a subsequent commission of any such offense, be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2
years, or both.
(b) Improper time or place; civil penalties
Any alien who is apprehended while entering (or attempting to enter) the United States at a time or place other than
as designated by immigration officers shall be subject to a civil penalty of(1) at least $50 and not more than $250 for each such entry (or attempted entry); or
(2) twice the amount specified in paragraph (1) in the case of an alien who has been previously subject to a civil
penalty under this subsection.
Civil penalties under this subsection are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any criminal or other civil penalties that may
be imposed.
(c) Marriage fraud
Any individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of evading any provision of the immigration
laws shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, orfinednot more than $250,000, or both.
(d) Immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud
Any individual who knowingly establishes a commercial enterprise for the purpose of evading any provision of the
immigration laws shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years,finedin accordance with Title 18, or both.
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8 USCA § 1326
8 U.S.C.A. § 1326
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 8. ALIENS AND NATIONALITY
CHAPTER 12-IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
SUBCHAPTER II-IMMIGRATION
PART VIII-GENERAL PENALTY PROVISIONS
Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Current through P.L. 108-58, (excluding P.L. 108-36)
approved 07-14-03

S 1326. Reentry of removed aliens

(a) In general
Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an order
of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at
a place outside the United States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney
General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously
denied admission and removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance
consent under this chapter or any prior Act,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien described in such subsection(1) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs,
crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under Title
18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both;
(2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined
under such Title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both;
(3) who has been excludedfromthe United States pursuant to section 1225(c) of this title because the alien was
excludable under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or who has been removedfromthe United States pursuant to the
provisions of subchapter V of this chapter, and who thereafter, without the permission of the Attorney General, enters
the United States, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under Title 18 and imprisoned for a period of 10 years, which
sentence shall not run concurrently with any other sentence. fFNll or
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(4) who was removedfromthe United States pursuant to section 1231(a)(4)(B) of this title who thereafter, without
the permission of the Attorney General, enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States (unless
the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reentry) shall be fined under Title 18, imprisoned for
not more than 10 years, or both.

For the purposes of this subsection, the term "removal" includes any agreement in which an alien stipulates to removal
during (or not during) a criminal trial under either Federal or State law.

(c) Reentry of alien deported prior to completion of term of imprisonment

Any alien deported pursuant to section 1252(h)(2) fFN21 of this title who enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time
found in, the United States (unless the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reentry) shall be
incarcerated for the remainder of the sentence of imprisonment which was pending at the time of deportation without
any reduction for parole or supervised release. Such alien shall be subject to such other penalties relating to the reentry
of deported aliens as may be available under this section or any other provision of law.

(d) Limitation on collateral attack on underlying deportation order

In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien may not challenge the validity of the deportation order described
in subsection (a)(1) of this section or subsection (b) of this section unless the alien demonstrates that(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order;
(2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for
judicial review; and
(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 53. PUBLIC SAFETY CODE
CHAPTER 3. UNIFORM DRIVER LICENSE ACT
PART 2. DRIVER LICENSING ACT
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session

53-3-205 Application for license or endorsement — F e e required —Tests —
Expiration dates of licenses and endorsements —Information required — Previous
licenses surrendered —Driving record transferred from other states —Reinstatement
— F e e required —License agreement.

(1) An application for any original license, provisional license, or endorsement
shall be:
(a) made upon a form furnished by the division; and
(b) accompanied by a nonrefundable fee set under Section 53-3-105.
(2) An application and fee for an original class D license entitle the applicant
to:
(a) not more than three attempts to pass both the knowledge and skills tests for
a class D license within six months of the date of the application;
(b) a learner permit if needed after the knowledge test is passed; and
(c) an original class D license and license certificate after all tests are
passed.
(3) An application and fee for an original class M license entitle the applicant
to:
(a) not more than three attempts to pass both the knowledge and skills tests for
a class M license within six months of the date of the application;
(b) a learner permit if needed after the knowledge test is passed; and
(c) an original class M license and license certificate after all tests are
passed.
(4) An application and fee for a motorcycle or taxicab endorsement entitle the
applicant to:
(a) not more than three attempts to pass both the knowledge and skills
within six months of the date of the application;

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

tests

Page 2
(b) a motorcycle learner permit if needed after the motorcycle knowledge test is
passed; and
(c) a motorcycle or taxicab endorsement when all tests are passed.
(5) An application and fees for a commercial class A, B, or C license entitle the
applicant to:
(a) not more than two attempts to pass a knowledge test and not more than two
attempts to pass a skills test within six months of the date of the application;
(b) a commercial driver instruction permit if needed after the knowledge test is
passed; and
(c) an original commercial class A, B, or C license and license certificate when
all applicable tests are passed.
(6) An application and fee for a CDL endorsement entitle the applicant to:
(a) not more than two attempts to pass a knowledge test and not more than two
attempts to pass a skills test within six months of the date of the application; and
(b) a CDL endorsement when all tests are passed.
(7) If a CDL applicant does not pass a knowledge test, skills test, or an
endorsement test within the number of attempts provided in Subsection (5) or (6),
each test may be taken two additional times within the six months for the fee
provided in Section 53-3-105.
(8) (a) An original license expires on the birth date of the applicant in the
fifth year following the year the license certificate was issued.
(b) A renewal or an extension to a license expires on the birth date of the
licensee in the fifth year following the expiration date of the license certificate
renewed or extended.
(c) A duplicate license expires on the same date as the last license certificate
issued.
(d) An endorsement to a license expires on the same date as the license
certificate regardless of the date the endorsement was granted.
(e) A license and any endorsement to the license held by a person ordered to
active duty and stationed outside Utah in any of the armed forces of the United
States, which expires during the time period the person is stationed outside of the
state, is valid until 90 days after the person has been discharged or has left the
service, unless the license is suspended, disqualified, denied, or has been
cancelled or revoked by the division, or the licensee updates the information or
photograph on the license certificate.
(9) (a) In addition to the information required by Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, for requests for agency action, each application
shall:
(i) state the:
(A) full legal name;
(B) birth date;
(C) sex;
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Page 3
(D) between July 1, 2002 and July 1, 2007, race in accordance with the categories
established by the United States Census Bureau;
(E) Social Security number or temporary identification number (ITIN) issued by the
Internal Revenue Service for a person who does not qualify for a Social Security
number; and
(F) residence address of the applicant;
(ii) briefly describe the applicant;
(iii) state whether the applicant has previously been licensed to drive a motor
vehicle and, if so, when and by what state or country;
(iv) state whether the applicant has ever had any license suspended, cancelled,
revoked, disqualified, or denied in the last six years, or whether the applicant has
ever had any license application refused, and if so, the date of and reason for the
suspension, cancellation, revocation, disqualification, denial, or refusal;
(v) state whether the applicant intends to make an anatomical gift under Title 26,
Chapter 28, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, in compliance with Subsection (16);
(vi) provide all other information the division requires; and
(vii) be signed which may include electronic signatures as defined in Section
46-4-102.
(b) An applicant's Social Security number or temporary identification number
(ITIN) shall be maintained on the computerized records of the division.
(c) An applicant may not be denied a license for refusing to provide race
information required under Subsection (9)(a)(i)(D).
(10) The division shall require proof of every applicant's name, birthdate, and
birthplace by at least one of the following means:
(a) current license certificate;
(b) birth certificate;
(c) Selective Service registration; or
(d) other proof, including church records, family Bible notations, school
records, or other evidence considered acceptable by the division.
(11) When an applicant receives a license in another class, all previous license
certificates shall be surrendered and canceled. However, a disqualified commercial
license may not be canceled unless it expires before the new license certificate is
issued.
(12) (a) When an application is received from a person previously licensed in
another state to drive a motor vehicle, the division shall request a copy of the
driver's record from the other state.
(b) When received, the driver's record becomes part of the driver's record in
this state with the same effect as though entered originally on the driver's record
in this state.
(13) An application for reinstatement of a license after the suspension,
cancellation, disqualification, denial, or revocation of a previous license shall be
accompanied by the additional fee or fees specified in Section 53-3- 105.
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(14) A person who has an appointment with the division for testing and fails to
keep the appointment or to cancel at least 4 8 hours in advance of the appointment
shall pay the fee under Section 53-3-105.
(15) A person who applies for an original license or renewal of a license agrees
that the person's license is subject to any suspension or revocation authorized
under this title or Title 41, Motor Vehicles.
(16) (a) The indication of intent under Subsection (9)(a)(v) shall be
authenticated by the licensee in accordance with division rule,.
(b) (i) Notwithstanding Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and
Management Act, the division may, upon request, release to an organ procurement
organization, as defined in Section 26-28-2, the names and addresses of all persons
who under Subsection (9)(a)(v) indicate that they intend to make an anatomical gift.
(ii) An organ procurement organization may use released information only to:
(A) obtain additional information for an anatomical gift registry; and
(B) inform licensees of anatomical gift options, procedures, and benefits.
(17) The division and its employees are not liable, as a result of false or
inaccurate information provided under Subsection (9) (a) (v), for direct or indirect:
(a) loss;
(b) detriment; or
(c) injury.
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U T ST § 76-6-302
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302

Tfai s document has been updated.

U s e KEYCITE.

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
PART 3. ROBBERY
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Iiic, a member of the

LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session

76-6-302

Aggravated robbery.

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery,
he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 7 6 - 1 - 601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course
of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission
of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I. Courts
CHAPTER 2a. COURT OF APPEALS
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session

78-2a~3

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to
issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission,
State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees,
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and
the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or
other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or
capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first
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degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including,
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support,
parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals fix:iii the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter
4 6b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I. Courts
CHAPTER 2. SUPREME COURT
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session

78-2-2

Supreme Court jurisdiction.

(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final
judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating
with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions
of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the
United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on
legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court
of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for
writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 4 6b,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I. Courts
CHAPTER 3. DISTRICT COURTS
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session

78-3-4

Jurisdiction —Appeals.

(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline
consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in
the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de
novo of the judgments of the justice court and of the small claims department
of the district court.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district
court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review:
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that
chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings; and
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3703.7.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter
jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and
violations of ordinances only if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1,
1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in
which the district courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed
a justice court; or
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single
criminal episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor.
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 701
WESTS UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
Copr. © West Group 2002. All rights reserved.
Current with amendments received through 9-15-2002.

RULE 701. OPINION TESTIMONY fi\ LAY WITNESSES

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
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Rule 704-. Opinion on ultimate issue,

(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of
a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element
of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for
the trier of fact alone.
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy therightto a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
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UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT XIV-CITIZENSHIP: PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: DUE PROCESS: EQUAL
PROTECTION: APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION: DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS:
PUBLIC DEBT: ENFORCEMENT
Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Current through P.L. 108-58, (excluding P.L. 108-36)
approved 07-14-03
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP: PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: DUE PROCESS: EQUAL
PROTECTION: APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION: DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS: PUBLIC
DEBT: ENFORCEMENT
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress,
the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President,
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath,
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote
of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for
payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
<Section 1 of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,>
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fRights of accused persons.1

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
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ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the
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§ 7

TDue process of law.1

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
JOHN N. SPIKES, 3062
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Screened by: J. Spikes
Assigned to: M. Kouris (Thursday)
DAO # 00020655
BAIL: $250,000
Warrant/Release: Non-jail

-vs-

JOSEPH MAKA LANGI
DOB 12/19/76,
AKA NONE
INFORMATION
10831 Avenida DeLos Lobos, San Diego, CA
OTN
Case No.
SO#
Defendant.
The undersigned Detective J. Lone - Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Agency Case No.
00-24920, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes
of:
COUNTI
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 5380 South 4015 West, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 26, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JOSEPH
MAKA LANGI, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal
property in the possession of Jose Farias from the person or immediate presence of Jose
Farias, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a
dangerous weapon, and/or caused serious bodily injury to Jose Farias.
NOTICE IS GIVEN pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1, that the defendant is subject
to an enhanced penalty as provided in that section because the above offense was
committed in concert with two or more persons.
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INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v. JOSEPH MAKA LANGI
DAO No. 00020655
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COUNT II
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 5380 South 4015 West, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 26, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JOSEPH
MAKA LANGI, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal
property in the possession of Gabriel Calvillo from the person or immediate presence of
Gabriel Calvillo, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use
of a dangerous weapon, and/or caused serious bodily injury to Gabriel Calvillo.
NOTICE IS GIVEN pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1, that the defendant is subject
to an enhanced penalty as provided in that section because the above offense was
committed in concert with two or more persons.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
J. Lone, J. Huggard, R. Montanez, C. Chase, L. Prescott, J. Farias, G. Calvillo, R. Garcia,
M. Pas, R. Briseno and R. Redding.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this Information upon the following:
1.
On February 26, 2000 at 5380 South 4015 West in Salt Lake County, three
Polynesian males attacked Jose Farias and Gabriel Calvillo at the Beta's Restaurant and robbed
them. When police responded, both victims were covered in blood.
2.

A security video camera recorded the attack. Witnesses who have watched the
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INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v. JOSEPH MAKA LANGI
DAO No. 00020655
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video and who have viewed photographs of the Defendant state that one of the attackers is in fact
the Defendant.

DETECTIVE J. LONE
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
day of October, 2000.

MAGISTRATE
Authorized for presentment and filing:
DAVID E. YQ60M, District Attorney

Deputy District Attorney
October 13,2000
cw/00020655
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DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
SIRENA M. WISSLER, Bar No. 7450
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

UEFEHSE
COPY

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
VICTIMS' IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTODY STATUS

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 001917415

JOSEPH LANGI,
Hon.

JUDITH S. ATHERTON

Defendant.
Comes now the State of Utah, by and through its attorneys David E. Yocom,
District Attorney for Salt Lake County, and Sirena M. Wissler, Deputy District Attorney,
and moves this Court to enter an order prohibiting defendant from inquiring into or
making reference to victim Jose Farias's immigration or custody status during the trial in
the above-captioned matter. This motion is supported by an accompanying
memorandum.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2001.
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County

Sirena M. Wissler
Deputy District Attorney
A-26

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of April, 2001, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Motion in Limine re: Victim's Immigration and Custody Status to
be mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to: Paul Gotay, Attorney at Law, 357 South
200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

J£LL

A-27

F | L I* L I : ^ ;>
LJ L» I t* * '<• W* ^
. „
l I X ^ >• •••
I III I f I
WWG

D AVED E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
SIRENAM. WISSLER, Bar No. 7450
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
VICTIMS' IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTODY STATUS

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 001917415

JOSEPH LANGI,

Hon. JUDITH S. ATHERTON

Defendant.

The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, David E. Yocom, District Attorney
for Salt Lake County, and Sirena M. Wissler, Deputy District Attorney, hereby submits
this memorandum in support of its Motion in Limine re: Victim's Immigration and
Custody Status.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. On February 26, 2000, three persons attacked, beat, and robbed Jose Farias
and Gabriel Calvillo at Beta's Restaurant in Kearns, Utah.
2. Defendant Joseph Langi has been identified as one of the persons who
participated in the beating and robbery of Farias and Calvillo.
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3. At the time of the attacks on February 26, 2000, Farias and Calvillo were
residing in the United States illegally, having emigrated herefromMexico.
4. On or about February 29, 2001, Jose Farias was arrested as a result of his
immigration status, and detained by the United States Marshal. Mr. Farias is
currently facing federal charges pertaining to his unlawful presence in the
United States.
5. Mr. Farias's federal charge remains pending. He will be held in the custody
of the Unites States Marshal until such time as the matter is resolved, either by
plea or verdict.
ARGUMENT
EVIDENCE OF MR. FARIAS'S IMMIGRATION STATUS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED
BECAUSE IT IS NOT RELEVANT.

The first issue presented is whether the defendant should be permitted to
introduce evidence as to either victim's immigration status. Specifically, whether the fact
that Jose Farias is, and was on February 26, 2000, residing in the United States illegally,
is relevant to the Aggravated Robbery at issue in the instant case. Utah Rule of Evidence
401 provides that "'relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah Rule of Evidence
402 provides that "evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Therefore, unless
the victims' immigration status falls within the definition of relevant evidence, it cannot
be admitted.
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Joseph Langi is charged with two counts of Aggravated Robbery. The elements
of Aggravated Robbery as to Count I are (1) that on or about February 26, 2000, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah; (2) the defendant, Joseph Langi, a party to the offense; (3)
took personal property in the possession of Jose Farias; (4) from the person or immediate
presence of Jose Farias; (5) and in the course of committing such robbery caused serious
bodily injury to Jose Farias. The elements of Count II are identical but for the name of
the victim. Whether the victims are legal U.S. residents has no tendency to make the
existence of any fact of consequence any more likely or less likely. It is certainly no
defense to these charges that the victims were not lawfully present in the United States or
Utah.

In addition, whether the victims were lawfully present has no bearing upon

whether they had personal property removed from their persons or immediate presence,
and certainly has no bearing upon the nature or extent of their injuries. Because the
victims' immigration status has no effect or impact on any element of the offenses
charged, evidence of that status is not relevant, and is therefore inadmissible.
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM ADMITTING EVIDENCE AS TO
EITHER VICTIM'S CUSTODY STATUS
The second issue before the Court is whether defendant should be permitted to
introduce evidence as to either victim's custody status. Again, as a threshold matter,
defendant must demonstrate the evidence is relevant. Unless relevant, the evidence is
inadmissible.
Victim Jose Farias is currently in custody. He is being detained by United States
Marshals, having been indicted for an offense based upon his unlawful presence in the
United States. Mr. Farias's federal matter remains pending. He has not been convicted
by jury, nor has he entered a plea. Utah Rule of Evidence 609 provides that "evidence

that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted,
subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which the witness was convicted..." Mr. Farias is a pretrial detainee - no conviction has been entered. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 609, his
credibility may not be attacked based upon the pending charge. Moreover, evidence of
Mr. Farias's custody status is not admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b),
because it is not offered for a non-character purpose.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that its Motion in
Limine re: Victims' Immigration and Custody Status be granted.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2001.

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County

Sirena M. Wissler
Deputy District Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of April, 2001, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to be mailed in the
U.S. Mails, postage prepaid to Paul Gotay, Attorney at Law, 357 South 200 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111.
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Paul Gotay (1224)
Gotay Law Office
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-533-8373
Fax: 801-539-5210
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND
REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY
HEARING
Case No. 001917415

Plaintiff.
vs.
JOSEPH MAKA LANGI,
Defendant.

I
I

Judge Judith Atherton

COMES NOW, the defendant, JOSEPH MAKA LANGI, by and through
his attorney of record, Paul Gotay, and pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure moves the Court
for an Order granting the defendant a new trial.
Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference is an
affidavit in support of Motion for New Triai.

It is anticipated

that many more affidavits or live testimony will be offered in
support of Motion for New Trial.
The affidavit and live testimony offered in support of the
Motion for New Trial draw into question the truthfulness of a
State's key witness against JOSEPH MAKA LANGI, specifically Siasi
Afu.
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Siasi

Afu

was

not

truthful

when

he

testified

at

the

defendant's trial, and his conduct, activities, and statements made
after the trial are consistent with the view that he was not
truthful when he testified at JOSEPH MAKA LANGI's trial.
It is further requested that at the time this matter is
scheduled for evidentiary hearing that the State produce Siasi Afu
for the purpose of being examined regarding these issues.

Respectfully submitted this

day of

, 2001.

PAUL GOTAY
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Motion for New Trial and Request for Evidentiary Hearing was
[
[
[
this

] sent by first-class mail, postage prepaid,
] sent by facsimile transmittal to #:
J hand-delivered,
day of

_ ,

2001, to:

Sirena M. Wissler, Esq.
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

PAUL GOTAY
Attorney at Law
2
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,

05/19/01

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

RE: JOSEPH MAKALANGI

STATEMENT OF FINEEVA MAKA
My name is Fineeva Maka, and I am Siaosi's friend, I have known him for couple of years here in Salt
Lake City, Utah. I have talk with Siaosi a couple of times about this case, and he has told me that the
prosecutor wanted him to testify against Joe as part of his deal and to dismiss his other cases. He also said
that it was the prosecutor who asked and told him about the stolen items. He did not see Joe took anything
from the two victim, because he has left the scene to go and pick up the car. He also told me that he has to
lie to tije investigator, because he was scared and doesn't want to stay in prison.
The above statement is true and if called to testify, I will testify.

Sincerely,

Fineeva Maka
(801)604-4112

M*~-+-Ga~~A

S-As/o/

NOTARY PUBLIC

SHANNA DANIELS
3570 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah S4119
Commission Expires

Jury 15, 2004

STATE OF UTAH
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Paul Gotay (1224)
Got ay Law Office
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-533-8373
Fax: 801-539-5210
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff.

Case No. 001917415

vs,
JOSEPH MAKA LANGI,

Judge Judith S.H. Atherton
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the defendant, Joseph Maka Langi, by and through
his attorney of record, Paul Gotay, and provides the Court with the
following Memorandum in Support of his Motion for a New Trial.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The defendant, Joseph Maka Langi, was convicted of aggravated
robbery on June 11, 2001.

The State's key witness in that

prosecution was Langi's co-defendant, Siaosi Afu, who testified
regarding conversations he had with the defendant, Joseph Maka
Langi, involving the robbery.

The jury, believing that the

conversations occurred between Joseph Maka Langi and Siaosi Afu
convicted Joseph Maka Langi of two counts of aggravated robbery.
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In June of 2001, the defendant re-filed a Motion for a New
Trial and Request for Evidentiary Hearing, along with an affidavit
of Siaoai Afu admitting that he lied when testifying at Joseph Maka
Langifs trial for aggravated robbery.

(Exhibit No.l.) Joseph Maka

Langi, in support of his Motion for a New Trial, also supplies the
Court with two other affidavits that corroborate Siaosi Afu's
statement.

Exhibits No*2 and No.3 consist of affidavits in which

Siaosi Afu admits to other third persons that which he states in
Exhibit No.l.

Virtually all of the evidence came to light after

the trial in that it consisted of statements made by Siaosi Afu
after the trial.

DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT CASE LAW
In 1991, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. James. 819 P.
2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) .

The defendant, Stephen Ray James, was

convicted of capital murder and received a life sentence resulting
from the death of his son.

During the State's case, the State

produced a person by the name of Ronald Peterson, who at the time
was an inmate at the Utah State Prison and who stated that Mr.
James had confessed to him.

Post-trial, James filed a Motion for

a New Trial on the basis of two pieces of evidence.

The second

piece of evidence was obtained from another person, who was an
inmate at the Utah State Prison and who stated, apparently in an
affidavit,

that

Peterson

had

told

this

person

(Lisner)

that

Peterson had fabricated his testimony at trial in an attempt to get

2
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better treatment from the State at his own criminal trial.

The

Motions were denied by the Trial Court, and the Appeal followed.
The Supreme Court at 819 P.2d 793 held as follows:
Additionally, in order to constitute grounds for a
new trial, evidence must meet three criteria:
(1) It must be such aB could not with
reasonable diligence have been discovered and
produced at the trial; (2) it must not be
merely cumulative; (3) it must be such as to
render a different result probable on the
retrial of the case. (Citation omitted)•
The Supreme Court, in discussing the standards for granting a
new trial in the State of Utah stated as follows:
However, the evidence of Peterson's perjury
stands on a different footing than that
presented in the first Motion. The evidence
was not reasonably discoverable before trial.
Peterson apparently spoke to Kenneth Lisner
concerning his fabrications to the police
about two weeks before the trial. He then
told Lisner that he would not go through with
the lie at the trial. Lisner only discovered
that Peterson had, in fact, committed perjury
by watching news accounts of the trial after
Peterson had already testified. Lisner did
not attempt to contact the defendant or his
attorneys concerning the conversation until
sometime in June 1989, after the trial, when
the defendant was placed in the same cell
block with Lisner*
Therefore, Lisner was
unaware of Peterson's perjury until near the
conclusion of the trial, and the defendant was
not aware of Lisner1s knowledge until well
after the trial...
The evidence also meets the second criterion
for newly discovered evidence.
The trial
judge found that Lisner1s testimony would be
merely cumulative of James' testimony that he
had never had a conversation with Lippencott.
The trial judge also based his denial of the
Motion upon the fact that the testimony to be
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presented by Lisner went merely to the
credibility of Peterson and did not present
new evidence of the defendant's innocence.
While it is true that the refusal to grant a
new trial based merely on credibility will
generally not be overturned on appeal, the
credibility evidence went beyond refuting the
testimony
of
Peterson
and
established
independent evidence that he had deliberately
committed periurv in an attempt to subvert the
trial process to his own ends. This evidence
was not merely credibility evidence
and was
not merely cumulative of James1 testimony that
he had not confessed to Lippencott. Lisner's
testimony concerned a disputed fact that arose
between Peterson's testimony and James1,
whether or not Peterson's testimony concerning
the overheard confession was truthful. The
testimony of Lisner would corroborate that of
James and provide independent evidence of his
version of the facts* Evidence from a neutral
third party is not merely cumulative of a
criminal defendants testimony. It is of a
different kind and nature than a defendant's
statements, and it certainly could have a
different quality in the eyes of the jurors,
who assess the credibility of the witnesses.
Regardless of Siaosi Afu's explanation or characterization of
statements made by him to the trial jury, which call into question
the truthfulness of his testimony, the fact that he has retracted
his testimony is not in dispute because of the existence of Exhibit
No.l, which consists of his own admission.

This Court is not

obligated to pass on the truthfulness of the statements made by
Siaosi Afu and is certainly not obligated to accept, as true,
Siaosi Afu's explanation for those statements.

There is little

dispute that Siaosi Afu has made the statements considering that he
notarized Exhibit No.l.

It is for a jury to determine whether or

not those statements made by Siaosi Afu, clearly impeaching his
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on

prior statements made under oath, were false or not.

The only way

that determination can be made is for this Court to grant a new
trial based upon the existence of these statements and allow a
fact-finder to pass on that credibility issue.
The three criteria for granting a new trial have been met. It
is undisputed that a large portion of the evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing was evidence discovered after the trial.

The

evidence is certainly more than cumulative, because there was no
independent

evidence

presented

at

the

trial

of

Siaosi

Afu's

untruthfulness • The third criteria requires that the evidence must
be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of
the case.

It is difficult to imagine more important

affecting a more important witness in this case.

evidence

It is direct

testimony and evidence, documentary and otherwise, of Siaosi Afu's
untruthful testimony at the trial.

There is no question that

Siaosi Afu was the key witness in this case.

.CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant, Joseph Maka Langi,
is entitled to have this Court grant his Motion for a New Trial and
conduct such a trial.

Respectfully submitted this Lh

day of

PAUL Gerj&Y

Attorney for

\uuuip

2001,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial was
[ ] sent by first-class mail, postage prepaid,
[ ] sent by facsimile transmittal to No*:
[ **.] hand-delivered,
this

2k.

day of

NftxA^e^

2001, to:

Sirena M. Wissler, Esq.
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

PAUL
Attorney at Li
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May 21,2001

To Whom It May Concern:

RE; JOSEPH M. LANGI

STATEMENT OF SIAOSIAFU
MY NAME IS SIAOSI AFU AND I AM JOE'S CO-DEFENDER IN THIS CASE. I AM GIVEN THIS
STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF JOE LANGI.
I AM SORRY TO SAY THAT I HAVE LIED ON THE INVESTIGATOR'S REPORT, BECAUSE IT
WAS A PART OF OUR DEAL TO TESTIFY AGAINST JOE, AND BECAUSE OF THE
PROSECUTOR'S PUSHING, AND COACHING QUESTIONS, I HAVE TO LIE. I DID NOT SEE JOE
TOOK OR STEAL ANYTHING FROM THE 2 VICTIMS, BECAUSE I HAVE LEFT THE SCENE TO
PltCK UP THE VEHICLE. IT WAS THE INVESTIGATOR THAT ASKED ME AND TOLD ME
ABOUT THE STOLEN ITEMS, AND ALSO TOLD ME THAT IF I TELL THEM WHAT THEY
WANTED TO KNOW, THEY WOULD GIVE ME A LIGHTER SENTENCES AND DISMISSED MY
OTHER CASES.
I TESTIFY TO THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE AND CORRECT STATEMENT MADE BY ME
ON THIS 22 DAY OF MAY.

SINCERELY,

SIAOSI AFU

^

/y

-&~7,

Cwy^v^Q—

a>•y^SX?

' / * * / ' /

NOTARY PUBLTCT ~?

SHANNA DANIELS j
3570 South 2700 West
I
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
Commission Expires
J
July 15, 2004
)

_ STATE OF UTAH
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^AJ**A 2May20,2001

To Whom It May Concern:
Re: Joseph Maka Langi
I am writing this statement to testify that I have known Siaosi or George in English, for long time and that
he is my close friend. Siaosi told me that he has to lie in court, because of the prosecutor's pushing, and
coaching questions. Siaosi said that it was the prosecutor and the investigator who told him about die
stolen items, but he did not see Joe took or stolen anythingfromthe victims, because he has left first to pick
up the vehicle. Siaosi also said that he make a deal with die prosecutor that if he testify against Joe, they
would let him out of prison and dismissed his other cases.
I testify to the above statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Sincerely,

Samuel Misini
(818)968-8293

j^jL**-tof4--

A-43

K^iOb^sA ^D

05/19/01

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

RE: JOSEPH MAKALANGI

STATEMENT OF FINEEVA MAKA
My name is Fineeva Maka, and I am SiaosPs Mend I have known him for couple of years here in Salt
Lake City, Utah. I have talk with Siaosi a couple of times about this case, and he has told me that the
prosecutor wanted him to testify against Joe as part of his deal and to dismiss his other cases. He also said
that it was the prosecutor who asked and told him about die stolen items. He did not see Joe took anything
from the two victim, because he has left the scene to go and pick up the car. He also told me that he has to
lie to tfce investigator, because he was scared and doesn't want to stay in prison.
Hie above statement is true and if called to testify, I will testify.

Sincerely,

Fineeva Maka
(801)604-4112

it^_(Wi>

*•/«/«/

NOTARY PUBLIC

SHANNA DANIELS
3570 South ^ V ^ t
Salt Laktf City, U*«*> & 4 1 1 9
Commission Expires

July 15,2004

STATE OF UTAH
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Case No. 2001-893
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION UNIT
INTERVIEWEE:

SIAOSIAFU (George)

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH MAKA LANGI

DATE:

JULY 18,2001

CASE No:

2001-893

RE:

PERJURY

Okay today's date is July 18th year 2001. Timerightnow is 10:30 hours. This is
a meeting with Defense Attorney David Biggs and his client Siaosi, spelling, S-I-A-O-SL
KJ:

You go by the name of Geoi^e?

SA:

George Yeah.

KJ:

Afa, A-F-U. This meeting is being held at the District Attorney's office, 231 east
400 south, Salt Lake City, Utah.

DB:

Before we begin I wanted maybe to uh, well short circuit this a little bit I told my
client that he is under investigation for perjury since that is what Sirena Wissler
indicated to me. Just as a general statement, "Before we begin, George wants you
to know that the following are the facts in this case, having to do with the Perjury
allegation. Number one; George doesn't read. George never read this document
that he signed. That's number one. Number two; it was never read to him
Verbatim by anyone. It was basically, distracted for him by his wife and then he
signed it but he never read it, cant read and didn't read it Um, Number three; he
never lied under oath. Number four: he did lie to the investigating officer initially
that only having to do with his participation. And that's what his wife told him
this thing said, that his wife said that two things this document said, one, that he
initially lied to the investigating officer which is accurate. But then he told the
truth. Second she said that this document said that he never saw his two codefendants actually take anything from the two victims. And that is true, he
didn't see that he was out getting the car in the car leaving but he did tell the
investigator that the gentleman in the back seat and I apologize I don't know
which co-defendant that is, showed him some bloody money and said do you
want some of this. And he said no. And so the document is incorrect when he
says that he, or infers that he lied on the stand, he did not do that. It's incorrect or
inaccurate when it indicates that he lied to the investigating officer concerning his
sore testimony. He didn't do that either. And lastly he wants everyone to know
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that Sirena Wissler did not coach him, and did not push him and did not threaten
him to testify in any particular way, that just did not happened. And he
apologizes to Mrs. Wissler and to the prosecution if he could read, he would have
read it if he...
S A:

Yeah I would have never signed anything like that saying that I lied under oath
cause I didn't lie under oath.

KJ:

And that's what the impression was when I read it. After reading the motion, the
motion does not, this memorandum does not even really compare to the statement
on this paper for one thing and I wanted to go through a series of questions and
talk to you about those.

SA:

Okay.

KJ:

And how they relate okay?

SA:

Okay.

KJ:

And I talked to Deputy District attorney Sirena Wissler about picking this apart
because in my opinion, it is not accurate of what you even signed okay?

SAt

Okay.

KJ:

What he is suggesting to the court you did okay.

SA:

Okay.

KJ:

And she didn't have a chance to really thoroughly read this, but I believe its all
gonna come, the truth is gonna come out in our little interview here today.

SA:

Okay.

KJ

Okay. And I that is what I want to stress, I want to stress truthfulness here.

SA;

Okay.

KJ

And that will all come to light okay?

SA

Okay.

KJ

Because Mr. Gotay is accusing you of perjury okay?

SA:

Okay.
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KJ:

Doesn't necessarily mean that we are accusing you of that okay? But that is what
he is accusing you of okay? But because he is accusing you of that, I have to
investigate because you were a witness for the state, Okay.

SA:

Okay.

KJ:

Does that make sense?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Okay. But since you are being accused of that, I need to read your Miranda
warnings okay? Even thought you are being represented by your attorney here
okay you have legal counsel here I'm still going to read you Miranda warnings
okay?

SA:

Okay.

KJ:

And that, that we just want the truth okay?

SA:

Okay.

KJ:

And at any time you don't need to answer or Mr. Biggs can step in and tell me so,
okay?

SA:

Okay.

KJ:

All right listen carefully. You have therighttoremainsilent anything you say
can and will be used against you in court. You have therightto consult to a
lawyer before answering any questions and to have a lawyer with you during any
questioning. If you can't afford a lawyer one will be provided for you free of cost
as you, it you want one, as you well know. Do you understand yourrightsas I
have explained them?

SA:

Yes.

KJ:

Okay. And you are here with legal counselrightnow and you are willing to talk
with me about this?

SA:

Yes sir.

KJ:

Okay. And I appreciate your summary of Mr. Afii's statement from the very start
Mr. Biggs. I believe we are all on about the same page here. But we want to get
it down because she has to prepare a response to his memorandum, as you well
know. Okay now let me start with the veryfirstthe letter that you have in front of
you is marked exhibit one and it's urn, I'm gonna read it for the record. It says it
has a date at the top it says May 21,2001. To whom it may concern; and then it
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says, re, reference Joseph M. Langi statement of Siaosi Afu. It says, "My name is
Siaosi Afu I am Joe's co-defender in this case. I am giving this statement on
behalf of Joe Langi. I am sorry to say that I have lied on the investigators report
because it was a part of our deal to testify against Joe. And because of the
prosecutor's pushing and coaching questions, I have to lie. I did not see Joe took
or steal anythingfromthe two victims, because I have left the scene to pick up the
vehicle. It was the investigator that asked me and told me about the stolen items,
and also told me that if I tell them what they wanted to know, they would give me
a lighter sentences and dismiss my other cases. I testified that the above
statement is true and correct statement made by me on this 22 day of May.
Sincerely Siaosi Afu. And then there is a signature in cursive it looks like it's
George Afu and thai there is another signature in cursive says Shanna Daniels.
With the date 5/23/01 and written and then there is Shanna Daniel notary republic
stamp on the bottom of the letter. As Mr. Biggs has already stated, you cannot
read, is that correct?
SA:

I can read a little bit but I can't read big words.

KJ:

Do you remember seeing this letter infrontof you?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Was it notarized infrontof you?

SA:

Yes.

KJ:

Okay Um, who prepared the letter? Who actually typed this out?

SA:

I don't even know.

KJ:

Who's idea was this letter?

S A:

It was brought to me by myfriendhis name is Sam.

KJ:

AfriendSam, what is his last name.

SA:

M-I...

KJ:

M-I?

SA:

S-I...

KJ:

S-I?

SA:

N-I.
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KJ:

N-I?

SA:

Misini.

KJ:

And when yourfriendSam brought this to you,

SA:

Yes.

KJ:

Atyourhouse?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Why did he say he was bringing it to you?

SA:

To sign it

KJ:

Okay what for, to help Joseph?

SA:

To help Joe yeah.

KJ:

To help Joe get out of the bad sentencing he had gotten right?

SA:

Yeah. I think he's, yeah.

KJ:

Cause he was convicted in trial?

SA:

Yeah. Well we didn't really talk about he just brought it and told me, "Hey this
the thing to help out Joe.

KJ:

Okay.

SA:

Anduh...

KJ:

You want to help out Joe and he's a friend?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

And you don't have no hard feelings towards him or anything like that? You did
not understand the letter and what it really said at the time that you signed it?

SA:

No, no I didn't, I thought that the letter meant that I lied to the detectives when I
got interviewed and that was what my wife told me.

KJ:

So when Sam Misini brought it over, he said this is to help Joe?

SA:

No.
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KJ:

And you kind of looked it over but you didn't really understand it?

S A:

Well I took it, well my wife; I gave it to my wife.

KJ:

And did your wife read it to you?

SA:

Yeah she read it and then she told me that and I asked her if there was anything
that would get me into trouble and she said she didn't think so but she didn't
know for sure though.

KJ:

Did Sam say that it wasfromMr. Gotay? That Mr. Gotay...

SA:

No I don't even think he knew where it came he camefromL.A.

KJ:

Okay so Sam didn't tell you that Joe's attorney that he had got it from Joe's
attorney?

SA:

No.

KJ:

Okay. And at the time that Sam showed this to you, Mr. Biggs vras not notified,
you did not call Mr. Biggs?

SA:

Oh no.

KJ:

And ask him about it or anything right?

SA:

No.

KJ:

And Sam didn't tell you that you had therightto talk to your attorney before...

SA:

No.

KJ:

You looked it over and signed it did he?

SA:

No.

KJ:

Okay. So nobody told you that you had the right to legal representation before
signing the letter such as this?

SA:

No.

KJ:

Are you aware that you do?

SA:

Yeah, I had known when he called me and told me that.
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KJ:

Yeah the best thing you could have done at that point was to call Mr. Biggs when
Sam showed up with this letter and read it to him even over the phone.

SA:

Okay.

DB:

That would have been the best thing to do. Just to clarify George, Your wife read
it, but she didn't read it to you she just read it and said this is what it says,
correct?

SA:

Yeah.

DB:

She didn't read it what is called verbatim she didn't read it to you she just read it
and said this is what it say's right?

SA:

Yeah that is right

KJ:

So she didn't read it out loud to you?

SA:

No.

KJ:

Okay.

SA:

I just asked her to read it and then I took off and then I came back and she told me
what was going on with it

DB:

Was this Shannon Daniels? Did you go somewhere to sign it where Shannon
Daniels was?

SA:

Yeah.

DB

Okay.

KJ

Is this the address where you went at 3570 south 2700 west?

SA

Uhyeah.

KJ

In West Valley?

SA

Right next to uh, West Valley Police.

KJ

West Valley Police?

SA

Yeah.

KJ

Okay and you went with Sam to get the stamp put on it?
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SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Okay let me talk to you about, a little bit about urn, what Mr. Biggs has said, you
told the investigator and also you know what I knowfromreading the interview
with the investigator and what I also know as what you testified to on the stand
okay?

SA:

Okay:

KJ:

Urn, I couldn't see anywhere on the investigators interview with you that you lied
about anything to be honest with you?

SA:

Uh-huh.

KJ:

Okay. You mentioned that you did lie to the investigator but I couian t see wnere
you did okay so if you can try to explain to me where do you think you lied to the
investigator?

SA:

Well I got, see the thing was, when wefirstgot caught...

KJ:

Uh-huh.

SA:

I never thought Joe would get caught so when we interviewed with the
investigator, I told the investigator I put everything on Joe.

KJ:

Uh-huh.

SA:

So when there was, you know when he asked about wallets I was like, "Yeah he
took them and...

KJ:

Uh-huh.

SA:

And he asked me where I, where he threw them and I told him see the whole
statement about Joe was all incorrect cause I knew Joe. I told him, the
investigator that I had dropped Joe off across the street from some church and I
never did that. There was a lot of things that had to do with Joe that I didn't tell
the investigator cause I never thought that they would catch Joe and when they
did catch Joe, they found out then that I was, that Joe knew, that Joe knew me the
whole time that they thought that this was going on they, when they caught Joe
they thought that Joe knew (Inaudible) the other defendant.

KJ:

Right.

S A:

But the whole time Joe was, Joe knew me that's how Joe got, ended up with us.

KJ:

So you lied about your relationship to Joe?
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SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

But you didn't, you didn't, that had nothing to do with the crime itself as far as...

SA:

No.

KJ:

Who did what in the crime?

SA:

Oh no, no, no.

KJ:

And as far as a wallet goes, you were telling the truth when you uh, told the
investigator and testified on the stand that you never saw who took the wallets?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

But you in the interview, you test, you told the investigator you saw Joseph pitch
the wallet out the window by the Methodist church?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Do you remember telling them that?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

You testified truthfully and you told the investigator truthfully that you did not
see who took the wallet at the time of the assault cause you'd already walked
outside to get a car?

SA:

Yeah,yeah.

KJ:

Okay. So the only lying you did to the detective was just your relationship with
Joe?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

How well you knew Joe?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

But not about the crime itself?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Also during the interview with the detectives urn, they never offered you any kind
of deal is that correct?
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SA:

No they didn't

KJ:

Yeah. So they never offered, you a deal that if you testified against Joe Langi
down the road or that you're going to get a better deal out of this, is that correct?

SA:

That's correct

DB:

May I also add that in our discussions together that there was never any indication
of that? Uh, at all that it would affect his sentencing what so ever.

SA:

That's correct

DB:

But I did indicate that it certainly might ifuh, if he were honest and forthright
That always is a helpful thing for a person to do when the Adult Probation and
Parole presentence is prepared. If the presentence people believe that you are
now being honest and truthful with them and you participation in the crime their
much more willing to work with you as a probation.

KJ:

So in all reality you did not lie about anything to the investigator about the crime
itself?

SA:

No.

KJ:

Or to or to the state when you were witness on the stand is that correct?

SA:

Oh I did not lie on the stand at all. The only time I lied was when Ifirstgot
caught and I was talking to the investigators.

KJ:

And you more or less minimized your relationship with Joe?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

You didn't tell them the whole...

SA:

Story about Joe.

KJ:

Story about how well you knew Joe?

SA:

No.

KJ:

But you did see him throw that wallet out the window by the Methodist church?

S A:

I seen, I seen him with money I can't, I don't even remember what I said back
then about the...
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KJ:

I, I understand it has been quite awhile.

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

I will refer back to page 24 of the interview with Detective Jeff Lone. He asked, I
will just mention a few statements on this interview. He says's, "Who had the
wallets." This is Jeff Lone talking he said, "Who had the wallets and threw out?"
Do you remember where and then you repeat, you answer, "Joe that Joe dude and
you're referring to Joe Langi right?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

And he says, "Cause they these guys you know they had their green cards in
them, all their personal papers and stuff." That's Jeff Lone then your answer is,
"Uh yeah, he threw outrighton the streetrightwhen we were drivingrighton 54,
you know what I mean cause we never went9" And then there is some inaudible
conversation and then uh, he asks, Jeff Lone asks you, "Let him out at the church"

SA:

That was a lie.

KJ:

Was that a lie?

SA*

Yeah.

KJ:

So there was little bits and pieces of where you lied to the...

SA:

Yeah cause see I never let him out at the church. I took; he slept over at my house
that night

KJ:

So that is what you'rereferringto?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Is little bits and pieces about where you let Joe out because you werefiriendswith
Joe?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

And you didn't want Joe to get in to trouble at that time?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Right.

SA:

Yeah.
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KJ:

Okay. So he slept at your house that night?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Any, can you think of any questions asked by you on the witness stand by either
urn, the prosecutor Sirena Wissler or the defense attorney Mr. Gotay, that you
were untruthful about? Was there anything on there that you migfat have lied
about during the trial of Joseph Langi?

SA:

You know what to tell you the truth, I don't I don't think I did.

KJ:

Uh-huh.

SA:

But you know I have been to trial so many times you know and they ask, you
know they I don't know, I have never been in courtrooms before and the way they
ask their questions is sometimes you know they spin them around and one person
will ask one thing and I don't, I just don't understand what they ask and that's just
the plain, you know that's just the truth of it Of sometimes I will say "yes" and
they'll say, "But you stated this day before, this day that you did." And I would
be like, "Well I guess then that's what I did then." But I don't, I don't, I've been
in court so many times that I don't even know you know what's truth and what's
not truth any more.

KJ:

I know that some of those questions can get extremely confusing.

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Um, but, George what I am asking is, urn, as far as you being truthful?

SA:

Uh-huh.

KJ:

Um, when it came to any fact about the crime itself?

SA:

Uh-huh.

KJ:

In your mind, you are not distorting the facts or trying to change what actually
happened?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Were you trying to be totally truthful at all times?

SA:

Oh yeah.

KJ:

Even when during confusing questions?
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Oh yeah, oh yeah.
Urn, at that point, there was no reason to lie about anything right?
No.
Uh, initially...
Once they caught Joe, there was no reason to lie about anything.
Right so you never intentionally lied on the stand?
No I never lied on the stand.
You were extremely truthful at all times?
Yes I was.
Okay. That, that's the whole point of this interview today.
Okay.
{s because uh, in the memorandum sent to the sent to our office, requesting a
motion for a new trial, your being accused of lying on the stand
SA:

No I never...
And at no time did you lie on the stand?
No way.

KJ:

You did not give the whole truth to the investigator about your relationship with
Joe?

SA:

Yes.

KJ:

But you did not lie even about the crime that occurred?

SA:

No.

KJ:

You told the truth about the crimefromthe start,fromthe time you went into
Beta's...

SA:

Yes I did
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KJ:

And confronted the two individuals um or, you just confronted the one individual
basically um, initially because of the, their staring problem?

SA:

Uh-huh.

KJ

And fear of a gun and things like that And that all came out in trial okay?

SA

Yeah.

KJ:

And, and we want, we wanted the truthfromthe start and, and you gave the truth,
is that correct?

SA:

Yes sir.

KJ:

Okay um, because your probably gonna have to be called upon to testify if their is
a motion for a new trial with the judge and that's gonna be what your gonna be
asked to testify to is your truthfulness.

SA:

Okay.

KJ:

Okay. Um,

DB:

George, Sirena Wissler never asked you to lie did she?

SA:

No she didn't

KJ:

And Kevin Judd never asked you to lie, did he?

SA:

I don't know who Kevin Judd is?

KJ:

I'm Keyb Judd. I never disked you to lie, is that correct?

SA:

No, no.

KJ:

Detective Jeff Lone never asked you to lie is that correct?

SA:

No he didn't

KJ:

Okay. Mr. Biggs touched on a point about this letter also. Um, itrefersto the
prosecutors pushing and coaching questions did Sirena Wissler or Mark Kouris
the previous prosecutor, did they ever push you or coach you into saying a certain
statement about what happened?

SA:

No.

KJ:

They did not?
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SA:

No they didn't

KJ:

Okay you remember Marie Kouris he was the previous prosecutor?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Okay cause that is, that is one of the statements that is on this letter that you
signed and that's, that's an important...

DB:

I can also state for the record that was always present with Mr. Kouris or Mrs.
Wissler when they spoke to George and I never witnessed anything of that nature
(Inaudible)

KJ:

Very good. Can you think of anything Mr. Biggs that I might be forgetting to ask
ofuh,Mr.Afii?

DB:

No I think you covered it

KJ:

Let me look over my notes briefly bare with me. As far as back to the reference
of lying to the investigator, can you think of anything else that you might have
lied about other than uh, your relationship with Joe?

SA:

No.

KJ:

And uh, letting him out of the church that night?

SA:

No.

KJ:

He sleptfityour house rather than let him out at the church and also...

SA:

Anything that has to do with that

KJ:

You didn't want the detective to know how close you actually were tb Joseph at
that point?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Okay. And at no time when you were under oath, when you gave that statement
to that investigator, is that correct?

SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

Under oath is when you, as you raised your hand on the stand, on the witness
stand, that is an oath.
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SA:

Yeah.

KJ:

And they didn't ask you to take an oath when you uh, met with Ihem and gave
them a statement?

SA:

No.

KJ:

Okay. I think that is about it Mr. Biggs?

DB:

That's fine.

KJ:

All right. This will terminate the interview with um, Mr. George Afu and his
attorney, David Biggs. Time right now is 11:00 on July 18th

SERGEANT KEVIN JUDD
Date: July 18,2001
Typed by: fib
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 001907415
JOSEPHMAKALANGL
Hon. Judith S. Atherton
Defendant.
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The State of Utah, by and through its attorneys David E. Yocom, District
Attorney for Salt Lake County, and Sirena M. Wissler, Deputy District Attorney, submits
this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. On or about February 26,2000, Jose Farias and Gabriel CalviUo were attacked
by three persons at Beta's Restaurant in Keams, Utah. Beta's Restaurant was
equipped with surveillance cameras, which captured and recorded the attacks.
2. Jose Farias and Gabriel CalviUo were accompanied by Rachel Redding at the
time they were attacked. Ms. Redding was not injured.
3. Defendant Joseph Langi was identified as one of the three persons who
attacked Farias and CalviUo as Redding looked on.
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4. Defendant Langi has not denied being present and participating in the attacks
on Farias and Calvillo. He claims, however, that he committed only assaults,
and not robberies.
5. During defendant's trial in April, 2001, Farias and Calvillo testified as to their
recollections of the events of February 26, 2000. Redding also testified as to
what she had observed as she watchedfroma few feet away.
6. The State admitted into evidence (without objection by the defense) a
videotape, which depicted the attacks. That video shows defendant Langi
searching through the pockets of the unconscious victims, although it is
unclear from the video whether any property was actually removed from
either man.
7. Farias testified that he had been wearing an eyebrow ring;, which had been
removed from him during the assault. Calvillo testified that his wallet, which
had been in his pocket and which contained money, had been removed from
him and was not in his pocket when he looked for it at the hospital.
8. Siaosi "George" Afu, one of the three people responsible for the attacks on
Farias and Calvillo, testified at Langi's trial. He identified Langi as a
participant, and also testified that after he had rendered Calvillo unconscious,
he fled the restaurant to retrieve the car. He further indicated that, because he
had left to go get the car, he did not actually see the defendant take or attempt
to take anythingfromeither victim.
9. Afu did testify, however, that when defendant Langi entered the car, Afu
observed that he had money in his hand and that the money had blood on it.

10. Following two hours of deliberation, the jury empanelled in the abovecaptioned matter returned verdicts of guilty on two counts of Aggravated
Robbery, each subject to enhanced penalties by virtue of the fact that the jury
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had acted in concert with
two or more persons.
11. Defendant then timely filed a motion for new trial, in which defendant
claimed that he is entitled to a new trial because co-defendant Siaosi "George"
Afu gave perjured testimony at trial.
ARGUMENT
I DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE HIS TRIAL DID
NOT CONTAIN ANY ERROR OR IMPROPRIETY. WHICH HAD A SUBSTANTIAL
ADVERSE EFFECT UPON DEFENDANTS RIGHTS.
The sole issue presented before this Court is whether defendant is entitled to a
new trial. The issue is, of course, governed by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24,
which provides that a trial court
may, uppn motion of any party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial
in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety, which had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
Among the grounds for new trial are jury misconduct (see State v. Durand, 569 P. 2d
Utah 1977)), prosecutorial misconduct (see State v. Owens, 753 P. 2d 976 (Utah App.
1988)), sufficiency of evidence (see State v. BeBee, 195 P. 2d 746 (Utah 1948), and
newly discovered evidence (see State v. Conrad, 590 P. 2d 1264 (Utah 1979); State v.
Williams, 712 P. 2d 220 (Utah 1985)). If present, and if determined to have affected the
substantial rights of a party, any of these improprieties may stand as cause to grant a new
trial. In his motion, defendant does not explicitly indicate under which of these theories

he believes he is entitled to a new trial. However, it appears as though he relies upon the
notion that he is currently in possession of some newly discovered evidence that calls into
question his guilt. Specifically, defendant asserts that co-defendant Siaosi "George" Afu
gave perjured testimony at trial. Not only does he allege that Afu peirjured himself, but
further alleges that he admits to having done so. (See Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for New Trial, hereafter 'Defendant's Memorandum," pages 2,4,5).
II.

DEFENDANT IS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS
CURRENTLY IN POSSESSION OF ANY NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE THAT WOULD ENTITLE HIM TO A NEW TRIAL.

In determining whether defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence, this Court should be guided by the principles most recently set forth
in State v. Boyd, 25 P. 3d 985 (Utah 2001). In Boyd, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed
the appropriate analysis to be conducted in reviewing a motion for new trial based upon
alleged newly discovered evidence. The Court explained
The legal standard to be applied when considering a motion for a new
trial based on newly-discovered evidence is that the moving party must
show that the evidence satisfies the following factors: (i) it could not, with
reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the trial; (ii) it
is not merely cumulative; and (iii) it must make a different result probable
on retrial.
Boyd, K27. Defendant correctly cites State v. James, 819 P. 2d 781 (Utah 1991) for the
proposition that where it is alleged that a new trial must be granted based upon the
perjury of a State's witness, the analysis is essentially the same. However, for the
reasons more fully articulated below, the State submits that State v. James is inapplicable
to the instant case.
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a. DEFENDANT MISCHARACTERIZES THE AFFIDAVIT OF SIAOSIAFU
In support of his motion for new trial, defendant asserts that the affidavit of Siaosi
Afu, attached to defendant's memorandum as Exhibit 1, contains statements "admitting
that he lied when testifying at Joseph Maka Langi's trial for aggravated robbery."
(Defendant's Memorandum at page 2). However, a closer reading of the affidavit of
Siaosi Afu reveals otherwise. In the affidavit, Siaosi Afu indicates that he "lied on the
investigator's report." See Exhibit 1, attached to Defendant's Memorandum. Nowhere
in that affidavit does Siaosi Afu admit that he lied under oath. Moreover, Siaosi Afu was
cross examined at Joseph Langi's trial, and during that cross examination, he admitted
that he had given statements to police that were inconsistent with his testimony at trial.
He ultimately even admitted to the jury that he had lied to detectives. On redirect,
however, he indicated that during the time he was interviewed by detectives, he was
never placed under oath, unlike the trial where he swore under penalty of perjury to tell
the truth.
b. SIAOSI AFU TESTIFIED TRUTHFULLY AT TRIAL.
What remains to be determined is whether there is any evidence tending to establish
that Siaosi Afu testified untruthfully at Joseph Langi's trial. Unless defendant can
demonstrate to the Court's satisfaction that there is some reason to suspect that Afu
perjured himself, defendant is left without a basis for new trial. In investigating the
allegations made by defendant that Afu had perjured himself, Sergeant Kevin Judd of the
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office contacted Afu's attorney, David Biggs of
Salt Lake Legal Defenders' Association. Sergeant Judd then arranged to conduct and did
conduct an interview of Siaosi Afu, a transcript of which is attached hereto as State's

Exhibit A. David Biggs was present during the entire interview, and Aiu was read his
Miranda rights, having been informed that he was under investigation for perjury. At the
outset of the interview, David Biggs made the shocking revelation that his client, Siaosi
Afu, is unable to read. (See Exhibit A, page 1). Siaosi Aiu confirmed tlhat he "can read a
little bit but I can't read big words." (Exhibit A, page 4). Afu went on to explain that
Sam Misini, an uncle to defendant Joseph Langi, had come to Aiu's home and presented
him with an affidavit, asking him to sign it to "help Joe." (Exhibit A, pages 4-6). Misini
never told Afu that he could talk to an attorney before signing the affidavit (Exhibit A,
page 6).1 Afu, being unable to read, gave the affidavit to his wife, who looked over it and
summarized it for Afu, telling him what she believed it said. (Exhibit A, pages 6*7). Afu
never read the affidavit himself, nor did he have it read to him word for word. (Exhibit
A, page 7). When he signed the affidavit, Afu thought it meant that he had lied to the
detectives when he was first interviewed shortly after the crime. (Exhibit A, page 5).
While his attorney was explaining Siaosi's difficulties reading the affidavit, Siaosi Afu
interrupted and indicated that he "would never have signed anything like that saying that
I lied under oath cause I didn't lie under oath." (Exhibit A, page 2).2
During his interview with Sergeant Kevin Judd, Siaosi Afu was asked about how he
had lied to investigators when he was first arrested. (Exhibit A, page 8). He indicated

1

Interestingly enough, Samuel Misini is the very person who purportedly authored defendant's Exhibit 2,
an affidavit in which Misini claims to have information relative to Siaosi Aiu's alleged perjury. Misini's
affidavit is suspiciously similar to the affidavit presented to Siaosi Afu for his signature. Conspicuously
absent from Misini's affidavit is any acknowledgement that he is related to the defendant in this case,
Joseph Langi. The Misini affidavit is neither sworn nor notarized
2
As further indication of Siaosi Afu's confusion relative to the affidavit, both he and his attorney took
pains to clarify that Afu had never been coached, pushed, or threatened about testifying or about the
substance of his testimony. (Exhibit A, pages 2,14-15). Moreover, Afu's attorney indicated that he had
been present during the State's discussions with Afu, and had never witnessed any undue influence on die
part of the State's attorneys. (Exhibit A, page 15). Clearly, Afu had no knowledge that the affidavit he
signed contained allegations of impropriety on the part of State prosecutors.

that he had lied about the nature and extent of his relationship to Joseph Langi, and about
where he had dropped Joseph Langi off after the crime had been committed (Exhibit A,
page 8, 9, 11). Afu, however, steadfastly denied that he had ever lied to investigators
about the specifics of the actual crime itself, or any participant's relative involvement in
it (Exhibit A, page 9,10). Most importantly, Afu categorically insisted "I never lied on
the stand." (Exhibit A, page 13). When asked again whether he had been untruthful
during Josqph Langi's trial, Afii answered 4CNo way." (Exhibit A, page 13).
It is apparent that the affidavit of Siaosi Afu, attached to Defendant's
Memorandum as defendant's Exhibit 1, does not stand for the notion that Afu committed
perjury during Joseph Langi's trial. At best, it demonstrates that Afu had been untruthful
to police investigator Jeff Lone during his interview shortly after the offense was
committed. Afu himself admitted at Langi's trial that he had been dishonest with J2fi£
Lone about certain things. He acknowledged that he was dishonest about his relationship
to Joseph Langi, and about some details of what had gone on in the moments
immediately after the crime. These facts, however, simply cannot qualify as "newly
discovered evidence" for one very simple reason - they are all facts known to the
defendant at the time of trial. Surely defendant cannot reasonably argue that he did not
know how long Siaosi Afu had known him prior to the night of February 26, 2000,
because it was precisely the same amount of time that Langi had known Afu. Moreover,
Langi knew full well about the moments after the crime, because he himself was in that
car. Not only could the defendant have discovered this information with the exercise of
due diligence, defendant actually knew this information prior to trial.
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Because Siaosi Afu categorically denies having testified untruthfully at Joseph
Langi's trial, and because there is no independent evidence establishing that Siaosi Afu
committed perjury, there is no newly discovered evidence before this Court upon which it
could grant defendant's motion for new trial.
IE.

DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE
ASSUMING. ARGUENDO. THAT THERE EXISTS SOME NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. THAT NEW EVIDENCE WOULD NOT
MAKE A DIFFERENT RESULT PROBABLE AT RETRIAL.

Assuming, arguendo, that this Court is satisfied that Siaosi AfiTs affidavit amounts to
evidence which could not have been discovered prior to trial in the exercise of due
diligence, this Court must then determine whether this new evidence is likely to produce
a different result were a new trial granted. Defendant asserts, without argument or
support from any source, that Siaosi Afu was 'the State's key witness." (Defendant's
Memorandum, page 1). He recounts Afu's testimony regarding certain conversations,
which occurred between Afu and defendant Langi in the moments after they had
committed a crime together. Defendant then asserts that "the jury, believing that the
conversations occurred between Joseph Maka Langi and Siaosi Afu convicted Joseph
Maka Langi of two counts of aggravated robbery." (Defendant's Memorandum, page 1).
The State is at a loss to explain how the defendant can presume to know what the jury
believed in arriving at its verdict. Defendant certainly does not attach any affidavit of
any juror indicating what may have occurred during deliberation, and indeed such
affidavits would be impermissible pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 606.3 In either

3

Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides that Ma juror may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to die effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissentfromthe verdict or indictment or
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith," except under certain carefully delineated
exceptions, none of which have been alleged in the instant case.
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event, the State disputes defendant's characterization of Siaosi Afu as a "key witness,"
and asserts that even without Siaosi Afu's testimony, the State had presented sufficient
evidence against defendant to secure his conviction on two counts of Aggravated
Robbery.
At defendant's trial, both Jose Farias and Gabriel Calvillo testified as to their
recollections of what occurred at Beto's Restaurant on February 26, 2000.

Their

companion, Rachel Redding, also testified, as did Deputy Jason Huggard and Detective
Lone, both of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office. Without question, the critical piece
of evidence in the State's case was a videotape, which had captured the events that
ultimately became the subject of the trial. The videotape was admitted without objection
by the defense, and was authenticated by Rachel Redding as truly and accurately
depicting the events of February 26,2000. That videotape, as the Court will likely recall,
captured in ghastly detail the attacks on Jose Farias and Gabriel Calvillo, including
defendant searching through both victims' pockets as they lay unconscious on the floor of
Beto's. The victims and Rachel Redding offered testimony pertaining to the removal of
Farias's eyebrow ring, and the taking of Calvillo's wallet. The only testimony that Siaosi
Afu offered in support of the State's robbery allegation was that after the incident, in the
car, he observed defendant Langi in possession of money that had blood on it. Afu stands
by that statement and indicated (as previously outlined) that he was absolutely truthful at
trial in that regard. However, even assuming that he was less than truthful, the testimony
of Farias, Calvillo, Redding and the videotape provide more than enough evidence to
support defendant's conviction of Aggravated Robbery.
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Defendant asserts, without argument, that "it is difficult to imagine more
important evidence afifecting a more important witness in this case." (Defendant's
Memorandum, page 5). To the contrary - Siaosi Afu's testimony at trial did little more
than provide drama when Afii pointed to defendant Langi and told the jury that indeed, it
was Langi who had participated in the savage beatings at Beta's Restaurant on February
26, 2000, a fact that Langi readily conceded at trial. Identification was never an issue
during defendant's trial. As early as opening statement, defendant conceded his presence
at Beto's on February 26, and acknowledged involvement in beating Farias and Calvillo.
In short, even assuming that this Court were to find that the affidavit recently signed by
Siaosi Afu, an affidavit which he obviously misunderstood, amounts to newly discovered
evidence, defendant is simply unable to demonstrate that this evidence would likely cause
a different result in the event of a retrial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's Motion for
New Trial be denied.
DATED this 23* day of July, 2001.

DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County

.Jti

SirenaMWissler
Deputy District Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial to be
mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to: Paul Gotay, Attorney for Defendant Joseph
Maka Langi, 357 South 200 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 001917415

VS.
JOSEPH MAKA LANGI,

MOTION HEARING

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON

SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-1860

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
SEPTEMBER 07, 2001
REPORTED BY:

TEENA GREEN, CSR, RPR
238-7104

simply indicate that I think itfs inappropriate at this point
in time for the defendant to now request that we conduct an
evidentiary hearing, when during the initial stages of this
motion the defendant specifically indicated that he did not
believe that witnesses would be necessary.
That having been said, Judge, the issue really comes
down to whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial based
upon the rule, which is Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24
which governs new trials, and the defendant, quite frankly, has
not come close to the burden that he bears in terms of the new
trial.
Your Honor, the State's position is that the
affidavit of George Afu, even on its face, does not indicate
that he committed perjury at trial; in fact, to the contrary.
What it says is that he lied to the investigators.

Well, the

State concedes that he lied to investigators, he told the jury
that he lied to investigators.

He told the jury that he had

lied about certain things that he was interviewed about by
Detective Jeff Lund.

Those are things that were known to the

defendant at the time of trial, they cannot amount to newly
discovered evidence.

That having been said, the defendant is

not entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered
evidence.
There is no other allegation, as far as I'm aware, of
what could be considered newly discovered evidence.

There's
9

DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
SIRENA M. WISSLER, Bar No. 7450
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL

JOSEPH LANGI,

Case No. 001917415

Defendant.

Hon. Judith S. Atherton

Defendant's Motion for New Trial came before the Court for argument on
September 7, 2001 at 2:00 pm. The defendant was not present, having been transported
to the Utah State Prison unbeknownst to the Court and counsel. However, defendant's
counsel, Paul Gotay, was present and requested that the motion be heard despite the
defendant's absence. The State was present and represented by Sirena M. Wissler,
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. The Court, having presided over the trial,
reviewed the memoranda submitted by each party, and heard oral argument, hereby
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant was charged with two counts of Aggravated Robbery, both First
Degree Felonies, following an incident that occurred at Beto's restaurant on
February 26, 2000.

Both counts of Aggravated Robbery carried group

enhancements, as it was alleged that in committing the offenses, defendant
acted in concert with two or more persons.
2.

Defendant was represented by Paul Gotay, who promptly filed both a Notice
of Appearance of Counsel and Request for Discovery.

3.

The State promptly responded to defendant's Request for Discovery and
provided, among other things, a transcript of an interview conducted with
George "Siaosi" Afu.

4.

Co-defendant Konai Bloomfield had already been convicted by a jury of two
counts of Aggravated Robbery with group enhancements. The other codefendant, Siaosi "George" Afu (hereafter "George Afu"), was offered a plea
bargain. He pled guilty to one count of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree
Felony, in exchange for his agreement to testify against Bloomfield and
Langi.

5.

Defendant Langi was tried before a jury beginning on April 25, 2001.

6.

During the defendant's trial, the State introduced as evidence a videotape of
the events that occurred at Beto's restaurant February 26, 2001.

7.

Defendant did not object to the admission of the videotape.

Rather,

defendant utilized the videotape, arguing at trial that the videotape showed
that while the victims were certainly beaten, they were not robbed.
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8.

As part of its case-in-chief, the State called George Afu to testify, who
testified under oath as to the events of February 26, 2000, and his role in the
events that occurred at Beto's on that night.

9.

Defendant had been notified well in advance of trial that the State intended to
call George Afu as a witness as part of its case-in-chief.

10. During his testimony, Afu admitted that when police initially interviewed
him, he was untruthful about his relationship with defendant Langi. He
testified that he had told police that he had only met Langi the night of the
crime, when in fact, he had known Langi for some time.
11. George Afu also testified that he had been offered a plea bargain and had
pled guilty to a reduced charge of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree
Felony, in exchange for testifying against defendant Langi.
12. At the time he entered his plea, Afu, who was then represented by David C.
Biggs, executed a "Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel, and
Order." That document was written in English.
13. In executing the Statement of Defendant, Afu acknowledged that he could
"read and understand the English language," or that "an interpreter has been
provided to me."
14. George Afu testified that he had participated in assaulting Jose Farias and
Gabriel Calvillo, and that when defendant Langi got into his car, Langi
appeared to be holding a wallet and money with blood on it. George Afu
indicated that he had not seen Langi take the wallet, because Afu had already
left the restaurant to go get the car.
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15. On cross-examination, George Afu was asked whether it was the detectives
who interviewed him who first raised the issue of the bloody money. Afu
indicated that he could not remember.

When shown one portion of the

transcript of that interview, Afu stated that it was the detectives who raised
the issue. On re-direct, and upon being shown an earlier portion of the
transcript, Afu acknowledged that it was he who first notified detectives that
he had seen defendant Langi holding bloody money.
16. Afu was also questioned on cross-examination about the plea bargain he had
received in exchange for his agreement to testify against defendant Langi.
He was shown a copy of the Statement of Defendant he had executed in
connection with his plea, and acknowledged that it indeed bore his signature.
17. After the State rested, defendant indicated that he did not wish to take the
stand in his own behalf. Defendant called no other witnesses.
18. At the conclusion of the two-day trial, and following slightly more than two
hours of deliberation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as
charged on both counts of Aggravated Robbery, and found beyond a
reasonable doubt that in committing the offenses, the defendant had acted in
concert with two or more persons, subjecting him to the group enhancement.
19. Defendant was sentenced on June 11, 2001.

This Court imposed two

indeterminate terms of 9 years to life, and ordered that the two terms run
concurrently and not consecutively.

A
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20. Defendant then timely filed a Motion for New Trial, attached to which were
what purported to be affidavits from three people: George Afu, Samuel
Misini, and Fineeva Maka.
21. The affidavit of George Afu contains a statement indicating that he "lied on
the investigator's report," and that "because of the prosecutor's pushing, and
coaching questions, I have to lie."

The affidavit bears George Afu's

signature and was notarized on May 23, 2001.
22. The affidavit of Samuel Misini contains a statement indicating that George
Afu told him "he has to lie in court, because of the prosecutor's pushing, and
coaching questions." The Misini affidavit further claimed that George Afu
told Minisi that "it was the prosecutor and the investigator who told him
about the stolen items, but he did not see Joe took or stolen [sic] anything
from the victims, because he has left first to pick up the vehicle."
23. In his memorandum in support of his motion for new trial, defendant Langi
alleged that the affidavit of George Afu contained an admission that Afu had
perjured himself during the trial. He later characterized the discovery of
Afu's "perjury" as newly discovered evidence.
24. Based upon the allegations leveled in defendant's memorandum, the State
contacted George Afu's attorney, David C. Biggs. Mr. Biggs and Afu agreed
to an interview on the subject of the perjury allegation.
25. During the interview, Afu was read his Miranda rights, and informed that he
was under investigation for perjury. Afu agreed to waive his right to remain

A
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silent, and agreed to speak with Sergeant Kevin Judd. David Biggs was
present during the entire interview.
26. David Biggs informed Sgt. Judd, on behalf of his client, that Afu does not
read English well. He indicated that at the time Afu signed the affidavit
which defendant attributed to him, he was not able to read the big words, and
that his wife had paraphrased it but apparently not read the document word
for word.
27. Afu admitted to having signed the affidavit, but indicated that he did not
understand what it said.
28. Afu indicated that he believed that in the affidavit, he was only admitting that
he had not been truthful to investigators when he was asked about his
relationship with defendant Langi.
29. Afu stated that he did not lie to police or anyone else about anything
pertaining to the events that occurred at Beto's Restaurant on February 26,
2000.
30. Afu vehemently denied on several occasions during his interview with Sgt.
Judd that he had lied to the jury during defendant Langi's trial.
31. Afu further denied that any State prosecutor had ever coached him as to his
answer to any question, and further indicated that he had not been pressured
or coerced. Afu's counsel confirmed that he had been present during the
prosecutors' meetings with his client, and had never witnessed any such
inappropriate behavior on the part of the State's attorneys.
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32. Afu affirmatively stated that he had been truthful when he testified at
defendant Langi's trial.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The revelation in the affidavit of George Afu that he lied to investigators does
not constitute newly discovered evidence. All of the matters about which Afu
admitted lying were matters know to the defendant at the time of trial.
Defendant was certainly aware of the fact that he had known Afu prior to
February 26, 2000, and was similarly aware that he had spent the night over
at Afu's house on the night of February 26, 2000.

Moreover, because

defendant was present at the time the crimes at Beto's were committed, any
discrepancies between Afu's version of events and his own were certainly
know to defendant prior to trial. Because these matters were known to
defendant prior to trial, they do not constitute newly discovered evidence.
2.

The affidavit of George Afu, submitted by defendant, is on its face,
insufficient to establish that Afu testified falsely at trial. Despite defendant's
characterization of it, the affidavit does not contain an admission by Afu that
he lied on the witness stand when he testified at defendant's trial. To the
contrary, the affidavit indicates only that Afu lied to investigators, a fact
which he admitted to the jury.

Defendant's assertion that Afu perjured

himself at trial is, therefore, unsupported.
3.

The affidavits of Samuel Misini and Fineeva Maka are double hearsay and
are so unreliable that this Court declines to consider thern when evaluating
defendant's motion for new trial.
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4.

Defense counsel had ample opportunity, prior to trial, to conduct an interview
with George Afu in order to ascertain any information that as not a part of the
formal interview conducted by police. Therefore, any information disclosed
during trial about which defense counsel had no prior knowledge could have,
with due diligence, been discovered prior to trial.

5.

Defendant's trial counsel conducted a competent cross-examination of
George Afu which appropriately addressed the issue of the plea agreement he
had reached with prosecutors in exchange for his testimony, and on the fact
that because he had left the restaurant prior to the robbery, Afu did not
actually witness defendant Langi removing or attempting to remove any
property from the victims.

6.

Based upon the transcript of Sergeant Kevin Judd's interview with George
Afu, this Court finds that George Afu did not perjure himself during
defendant Langi's trial. Any inconsistencies in his statements, or bias that
may have arisen as a result of Afu's plea agreement with the State, were
properly explored on cross-examination.

7.

Also based upon this Court's review of the transcript of Sgt. Judd's interview
with George Afu, this Court is satisfied that no representative of the State
coached George Afu regarding his testimony, nor was George Afu coerced or
pressured by any representative of the State.

8.

Notwithstanding defendant's argument to the contrary, the evidence of
defendant's guilt in this case was overwhelming. The videotape admitted
into evidence, which captured the offenses in progress, provided sufficient
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evidence to convict defendant. That video, particularly when coupled with
the testimony of Jose Farias, Gabriel Calvillo, Rachel Redding, and George
Afu, was so compelling that it makes the likelihood of a different result
extremely remote. That is, even if this Court were to determine that some
newly discovered evidence existed which could not have been discovered
with due diligence prior to trial, that new evidence would not make a
different result probable at a new trial.
9.

Because this Court was not provided a transcript or other recording of George
Afu's guilty plea in connection with his own involvement in the events that
occurred at Beto's on February 26, 2000, this Court did not consider any
issue related to the entry of that plea in reaching these Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

This Court hereby enters the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on the issue of defendant's Motion for New Trial. Based upon those findings, and for the
reasons enumerated above, defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied.

DATED this J^/

day of_}U_c^_,

Jtj
T>TAH

j'hftdfDifctrict Court
:OV
THIV.•!->

Approved as to form:

Attorney for Defendant Joseph Langi
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 6,h day of February, 2002,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Defendant's Motion
for New Trial to be mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to: Joseph Jardine, Attorney
for Defendant Joseph Langi, 39 Exchange Place, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

REG MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

vs.

Case No: 001917415

JOSEPH MAKA LANGI,
Defendant.

Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON
Date: 03/15/2002

Clerk: heathemh
HAVING RECEIVED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THE COURT SIGNS STATE'S PROPOSED ORDER AS
DRAFTED.

;is

Page 1 (last)
A_»4

Rstss*s*:

Case No: 001917415
Date:
Mar 15, 2002
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 001917415 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail
Mail

Dated t h i s

jB

day of

(WAVch

NAME
WISSLER SIRINA
PAYOR
inJOSEPH JARDINE
ATTORNEY DEF
39 Exchange Place
Suite 100
Salt Lake City UT 84111

, 20 (XL.

Deputy Court Clerk

Page 2 ( l a s t )

EdwinS. Wall, A7446
WALL LAW OFFICES
68 South Main Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Phone Number: (801) 523-3445

tf:-l

^ / ^ ^ '
- ••<.<: 02 ^ W W *
J
""
^ ^
8^™
';uTY
__

\'"*"
r '

i-

_

:

""

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 001917415 FS

v.
JOSEPH LANGI,

Hon. Judith S.H. Atherton

Defendant.

ORDER OF
FINAL JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT

On April 25,2001, the defendant was tried before a Jury and convicted on two counts of
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of U.C. § 76-6-302, as amended.
On June 11,2001, the Court sentenced Mr. Langi in open court. The court imposed
sentence as follows: (a) on Count I, Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State prison, (b)
on Count II, Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, to an indeterminate term of not less than
five years and which may be life in the Utah State prison; (c) with respect to Count I and Count
II, that the terms of imprisonment on Count I and Count II shall run concurrent with one another;
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and further found (d) that Mr. Langi's sentence was subject to gun and gang enhancements, said
findings being of record and thus ordered the defendant to serve a term of not less than nine (9)
years and which may be for life in the Utah State Prison.
The Court remanded the defendant to the custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff for
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.
On June 11,2001, the Court further ordered that the defendant pay restitution in the
amounts of $3,728.47 and $3,603.53, together with such interest as might be authorized by law.
On September 19,2002, the Court of Appeals for the State of Utah entered its
Memorandum Decision in State of Utah v. Joseph Maka Langiy Case No. 20020396-CA, 2002
UT App 296 in which the Court of Appeals stated:
The district court docket reflects that Langi was orally sentenced on June 11,
2001. However, no signed judgment and sentence appears in the district court
record that was transmitted to the Court. Because no final and appealable
judgment has been entered, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.... The time for
initiating an appeal will not commence until entry of the signed judgment and
sentence in the district court.
* **

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to a
timely appeal filed after the entry of final judgment.
NOW THEREFORE, this Court enters its Final Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in
the present case in accordance with the pronouncement of the court on June 11,2001, to wit:

ORDER
IT IS ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that Mr. Joseph Maka Langi is sentenced on Count
I, Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, to an indetermanant term of not less thanfiveyears

2
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and which may be life in the Utah State prison.

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that Mr. Joseph Maka Langi is
sentenced on Count II, Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, to an indetermanant term of
not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State prison.

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the sentences imposed by this
court with respect to Count I and Count II shall run concurrent with one another.

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND ORDERED, pursuant to the findings made of
record in this matter, that Mr. Langi's sentence is subject to gun and gang enhancements, and that
the sentence that has been imposed upon him by this court shall be so enhanced and that Mr.
Joseph Maka Langi shall serve a term of not less than nine (9) years and which may be for life in
the Utah State Prison.

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND ORDERED, pursuant to the findings made of
record in this matter, that Mr. Langi pay restitution in this matter in the amounts of $3,728.47
and $3,603.53, together with such interest as might be authorized by law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Joseph Maka Langi be, and has been, remanded
the defendant to the custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff for transportation to the Utah State
Prison where the defendant will be confined.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Joseph Maka Langi be, and hereby is, committed
to the Utah State Department of Corrections, Utah State Prison, and that such commitment is and
shall be effective as of June 11,2001.

FURTHERMORE, IT IS ORDERED this is, and shall be construed to be, the final
written order ofjudgment, sentence and commitment of the court in the above-entitled matter, for
which the defendant has therightof a direct appeal.

Done in chambers this

day of

, 2002.

BY THE COURT:

A/
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Edwin S. Wall, do hereby certify that on this '
<jay of A^y**-^^—
.
November, 2002, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the person
at the address indicated below by placing the same into the United States Postal Service, first
class postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

District Attorney's Office
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Edwin S. Wall
Attorney at Law
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Edwin S. Wall, A7446
WALL LAW OFFICES
68 South Main Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Phone Number: (801) 523-3445

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 001917415 FS
Hon. Judith S.H. Atherton

JOSEPH LANGI,
Defendant.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Joseph Langi, Defendant in the above-entitled action,
hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Courtfromthe Judgment of Conviction rendered against
him on November 13,2002, by the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton, Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Mr. Langi was sentenced by the court on Count I and Count II, both Aggravated
Robberies, to two concurrent terms, enhanced by a gang enhancement. Mr. Langi sentence in
this matter is to serve a term of not less than nine (9) years and which may be for life in the Utah
State Prison.
He was further ordered to pay restitution in the amounts of $3,728.47 and $3,603.53,
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together with such interest as might be authorized by law.
Respectfully submitted this Z_ day of » 4 » » ^ w

. 2002.

Edwin S. Wall, Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Edwin S. Wall, do hereby certify that on this %> day ofA^>/£
_ , 2002, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was served upon the person at the
address indicated below by placing the same into the United States Postal Service, first class
postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Ms. Sirena Wissler
District Attorney's Office
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

f
Edwin S. Wall
Attorney at Law
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